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The Centre  for Development Studies (CDS)  was established in 1997 as  a research 
programme specializing in development studies. Having lived under occupation 
since 1967, Palestinian society’s right to development remains severely restricted. 
The CDS therefore aims to deepen and engage development concepts through 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks that explore and conextualise Palestinian 
development within the occupation reality.  This includes studying the interac-
tions between the economic, social and political determinants of development 
as well as the structures of power and dominance which preclude sustainable 
development. In addition, the CDS seeks to provide an institutional framework 
within which all development-related  issues can be considered, researched and 
discussed, with a view to providing practical guidance and assistance for relevant 
decision makers.
The CDS reinforces theory with practice through its various academic research 
and community-oriented activities. These include seminars, workshops, survey re-
search, evaluation studies and needs assessments.  The Centre coordinates a num-
ber of academic research projects in the area of development with local and inter-
national institutions.  It is also involved in community-based projects that seek to 
empower marginalized groups and integrate them in the development process. 
The Center’s activities are supervised by a committee of academic and adminis-
trative staff members from Birzeit University,  who provide it with both technical 
and academic support. Over the years, the CDS has built an extensive network 
of relations with grassroots organizations, the Non-governmental sector, interna-
tional organizations and the government. The Centre has also executed projects in 
neighboring countries, particularly in relation to Palestinians in the Diaspora.  The 
CDS has been supported in its activities through funding from numerous local and 
international donors.
A Reading  on the Socio Urban Changes in Ramalah 
and Kufur Aqab
Class disparity and consumerism together with service economy expanded in 
detriment of other economic sectors. This statement summarizes the prevailing 
political economy in the past two decades in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
virtually in cities and rural areas.
Any observer of the urban alterations with gigantesque buildings and increased 
small, medium and large sized service establishments, not to mention the change 
in the landscape of cities and its expansion into the country side, can apprehend 
part of the “new” Palestinian life narrative. It is set up with neoliberal acts that 
range between legally framed official policies and large private sector companies 
to market margins and the new patterns imposed by these alterations. There is 
intense distortion of productive and empowering sectors, or in other terms the 
sectors that could enhance the steadfastness and resilience of ordinary people.
Needless to say that this is conceptualized at both physical and moral levels while 
Palestine still lives in a colonial context. Any observer interested in the mecha-
nisms of political economy will realize that such changes cannot constitute an al-
ternative to the economies and hegemony of the colonization and consequently 
cannot oppose or resist its domination. 
Ramallah is in the front of this new landscape as it hosts amid its neighborhoods 
the camps of Alamaari, Qalandia and Qadoura not to mention the nearby Jala-
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zoun Camp. These camps with still living memory of the Nakba (1948 occupation) 
continue to suffer daily. Between Ramallah and Qalandia Camp lies Kufur Aqab, 
a flagrant example of restricting populated and urbanized space to features that 
contradict with its rural specificity. All such acts take place under a structural sys-
tem imposed by the colonization on the inhabitants of Jerusalem. The occupa-
tion procedures force them to change their residential area to allow family re-
unification to take place or to preserve the Jerusalem ID. There in Kufur Aqab, 
thousands of Palestinians share an urban chaos that lack minimum legal, engi-
neering or even decent environmental and humanitarian standards. Amid this 
chaos, we cannot ignore the byproducts of the daily colonial occupation prac-
tices on the streets of our cities and villages, cold-blood executions of our young 
me and women, the isolation and closure imposed upon humans and their space. 
It is a different scene from the reality on the ground and the misleading urban 
landscape.
The main purpose behind these two studies is to produce a visual and meth-
odological documentation to understand the social partition and fragmentation 
that is taking place in urban centers and examine their expansion to understand 
their patterns and see who wins and who loses in the Palestinian economic politi-
cal perspective of Ramallah and Kufur Aqab. 
Ayman AbdulMajeed
Center for Development Studies
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1. Why Ramallah?
At first, I was asked to write a research about the gentrification of poor areas in the 
City of Ramallah1, i.e. the transformation of poor residential areas in the city into 
zones inhabited by the middle class or bourgeoisie after restoration and develop-
ment of their physical and service infrastructure. 
I have not noticed in my daily acquaintance with Ramallah over the past two de-
cades any such transformation2, but rather another form of transformation. The 
rapid horizontal and vertical urban expansion serves the life style of the middle 
class, but noticeably without including the acquisition of old and deserted houses 
in the poor areas to rehabilitate them for use of the well off. 
What is mainly taking place is the construction of entirely new neighborhoods 
and suburbs, like the cities of Rawabi, Rehan, Yasmeen, Alghadeer, Alsendian and 
Reef.3 All these names give an impression of serenity, suburbs nature, fresh air and 
prosperity, as marketed (or so is thought) by real-estate developers for middle 
1. To constitute a credible picture of the development of Ramallah from a small village in the 19th century into 
its current urban form, and its subsequent demographic and urban growth, and of the changes endured the 
Old City (Ramallah Altahta) following the demolition of many historical buildings that date back to the Jor-
danian administration times and later, see Issa, E., Joudeh, L., Handbook of Preservation of the Historical City 
Center of Ramallah, series of papers on the Architectural History of Palestine (17), Ramallah (undated, most 
probably 2014)
2. I later discovered a supporting opinion in an unpublished draft paper by Khaldoun Bisharah (Director of Riwaq 
Institution), in which he concludes that the gentrification of Ramallah-Albiereh is impossible. He adds that 
the Palestinian middle class considers the old neighborhoods as a sign of retardation and less civilized zones.
Khaldun Bshara, “Shifting trends: the impossibility of gentrification in the Palestine cities’ context” (Draft paper 
for presentation within the City Debates 2015, AUB), 2015.
Mr. Yazeed Anani said in an interview that Ramallah was undergoing a particular type of gentrification (i.e. 
architectural colonization with social class dimension) to take the form of visual replacement or as per the 
functional value of the term.” In other terms, there are areas (like Ramallah City-Center), which take specific 
architectural and functional forms (offices, stores, restaurants, cafés, hotels) while totally new areas with novel 
architecture appear.
3. Reef Company Website (http://reefbayder.ps) states, “At 1 KM from the Main Ramallah-Birzeit Street, near the 
Town of Abu Qash, lies an overlooking and gracious hill, from which you can see the Palestinian coast. Baydar 
for Construction and Development chose this place to build its unique Reef Compound with modern and 
registered villas, comprising detached and semi-detached villas with two storeys, a roof and other areas add-
ing up to 300 – 370 sq. m.
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and upper middle classes (whether in the public, private or civil sectors). It is clas-
sified under the same context that transformed the public “recreational zone” of 
Sarryiat Ramallah into a place designated to specific social strata of the middle 
class since it integrated private capital, as some respondents stated (interview No 
30). See list of interviews in the end of the study.
A closer description is the transformation of the landscape into multi-storey, 
multi-apartment buildings constructed (as commonly referred to) “commercially. 
This was the case in Ein Um Alsharayet Neighborhood (Interview 9) where resi- 
dences were transformed into “cans of Sardine” (interview 8). It is not difficult to 
find the tall buildings erected in the center of Ramallah in the aftermath of the 
Oslo Accords, which have vertically changed into (random) poor neighborhoods 
because of the poor public services and infrastructure and their internal decay.
The question of Ramallah comes to mind since the city has noticeably (urbanely 
and demographically) grown over the past two decades. This rapid growth took 
place after the PA advent and its decision to use Ramallah as institutional seat. 
This growth took place while the city, like other areas occupied in and before
1967, are still subjected to a racist colonialist settler occupation. The colony of Beit 
El lies at the boundary of the City, at barely one kilometer from the Muqata’ah, 
the PA headquarters. Ramallah is separated from Jerusalem by the Checkpoint of 
Qalandia while Attarah Checkpoint lies at its northern entrance. It is surrounded, 
like other cities, by a separation wall, military checkpoints and bypass roads. The 
Israeli Ofra Camp, where hundreds of Palestinian young people are detained, is at 
a short distance from the city. Moreover, it is placed under security and adminis- 
trative restrictions (a permit system for treatment, visits, work, import and export) 
on mobility inside the Palestinian area occupied in 1967 and between this Terri- 
tory and the Palestinian land occupied in 1948. Although the city itself is classified 
as Area “A” (which means it is under full Palestinian security and administrative 
control), the Israeli army still enters when it wishes to search and arrest people (in- 
cluding members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and political leaders). We 
can still recall the invasions of the Israeli army in Ramallah in 2002 and remember 
how it distorted PA premises and destructed the premises of the PA president, 
Yasser Arafat, placing him under forced stay until his departure for treatment in 
France where he died in November 2004.
The reality imposed by the Israeli colonialist settler occupation on the city, among 
other cities, is the reason why we should question the motor agent behind the
10
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construction, service and recreational expansion of the city. It also leads us to ex- 
amine how it undertakes its role as the “capital city” and the numerous  cafes, res- 
taurants, cinemas, theaters, galleries, stores, hospitals, clinics, apartments, villas 
and streets crowded with vehicles, pedestrians  and sellers. It is at very short-time 
distance from Jerusalem, which we all still insist is the capital of our future state, 
and which is being publicly and daily “Israelized”.
Ramallah celebrates, or is almost daily celebrating, its urban, service and recre- 
ational expansion notwithstanding the absence of any pillars of state or sover- 
eignty and although Israel keeps control of all aspects of Palestinian life in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
This paper, in its main part and annexes, aims to review a large sample of opinions 
and literature4 to understand the happenings of the city in particular and to mo-
tivate thinking about the phenomenon of urbanization in Palestine under its co-
lonial settler occupation condition. The paper takes Ramallah as a model and it is 
therefore necessary to study other models. The most important question is prob-
ably whether Ramallah can, with its residents and daily migrants from nearby vil-
lage and towns, and with its local, national and international institutions, combine 
its being a city occupied and circulated by colonial settlements on the one hand 
and a globalized pluralist liberal city on the other. Can it conciliate co-existing the 
occupation and resisting it in the same time? Can it conciliate the hegemony of 
greedy capital (neoliberalism) led by values of individualism and profit on the one 
hand and the dream of building a society led by the values of freedom, equality, 
solidarity and justice on the other. Can it regulate this relationship between the 
culture of consumption it celebrates and another (unborn) culture?
The paper is demised on numerous resources, including the researcher’s own ex-
perience after having lived and worked in Ramallah in the past two decades. It 
also includes desk review of literature on the city (as stated in the notes) and con-
versations with persons closely related to the city (Annex 1.1) and interviews con-
ducted via the Center for Development Studies – Birzeit University with a number 
of investors and members of government and civil agencies (Annex 1.2).
This paper does not support the demise of the city officials and those who cel-
4 Two books were published about Ramallah, but I did not have the opportunity to read them. The first is a 
biography and the other is a novel. The first is by Farouq Wadi, titled Manazel alqalb, Houses of the Heart, Arab 
Institute for studies and Publication, Beirut, 1997. The second book is by Inas Abdallah, No Angels for Ramal-
lah, Dar Fadaat Alnashr, Amman, 2010
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ebrate Ramallah as a lively city with intellectual, political, religious, and cultural 
pluralism while ignoring the fact that it is subjected to a greedy and vicious colo-
nization. It does not analyze the city without taking note of the increasing cost of 
living and social and class differences that span extravagance to severe poverty. 
We cannot ignore also its role as the political, administrative and cultural capital 
of the declared Palestinian authority and state (which is actually alienated) and 
Jerusalem, the irreplaceable Palestinian capital. This paper raises the question of 
Ramallah, without pretending to giving answers thereto, for a definite answer re-
quires more thorough search and perseverance.
The paper concludes that three main powers promote Ramallah in direct and in-
direct ways and control its architectural, economic, social, security and cultural 
trajectory. These forces are: 1) Israel with its racist colonialist presence and the 
way it markets Ramallah to be in practice an alternative to Jerusalem. This involves 
its control over the city borders and its relations with other Palestinian zones; 2) 
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which is leading the class formations 
in the city as is the case in the communities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is 
mainly transforming Ramallah into a city that matches the taste and life style of 
the middle class and capital owners through the roles and orientations of its dif-
ferent institutions. 3), the financial and real-estate capital (local, returnee or from 
the Gulf areas), which produced new architectural and residential forms in the city 
and created a new hierarchical relation among its components and between such 
components and its surrounding. This capital, alongside many local and interna-
tional civil society organizations, together with the PNA, generate a state of denial 
of the colonialist reality and the excessive dependency faced by the Palestinian 
society with its political, economic and cultural forces.
2. Hijacking the Palestinian city
The double colonization of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel left 
direct and successive impact on many aspects of the life of the Palestinian people, 
which included rapid exclusion of Palestinian farmers from the economic activity 
of the Palestinians in their different locations, whether in their Israeli controlled 
home-land or in the Diaspora.
However, the farmers and handcrafters exclusion did not take place in the context 
of growth of the Palestinian city since it happened after Israel hijacked the pros-
perous coastal cities of Palestine (Jaffa, Haifa and Akka) and cleansed them of their 
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indigenous population while it divided the cultural and religious capital of Jerusa-
lem.  In the same time, it preserved the inner cities (Nablus, Hebron, Jenin, Tulka-
rem and Gaza) and their local texture and conservative composition during the 
Jordanian administration over the West Bank and Egyptian rule of the Gaza Strip.
After 1948, the Palestinians no longer had cities, which with their own capacities, 
could transform into interconnected socioeconomic and cultural centers. The Pal-
estinian social classes, as per their national affiliation, became isolated from one an-
other. The middle class started to form (until the PNA takeover in 1994) in metropoli-
tan capitals outside Palestine, in Jordan, the Gulf, USA or Europe to fulfill their class 
conditions. As for the largest part, the workers, until early 1990s, they were forced 
under the terms of the settler colonization state rules. Workers in Israel, in 1970s and 
1980s, represented over half of the Palestinian labor class. Many of them came from 
villages and camps. As for the Palestinian national capital post 1948, it found the op-
portunity to form outside Palestine and had to invest in mostly non-Palestinian labor 
force. The largest part of the Palestinian bourgeoisie grew in the Diaspora, or outside 
Palestine, building capital without investment in labor force, with the exception of 
Jordan where a large percentage of workers came of Palestinian origins. They rather 
invested in their area of activity outside Palestine, a situation that persisted until 
the last decade of the past century when some of them started to invest in the PNA 
areas. On the other hand, the largest share of the Palestinian capital has not devel-
oped through capital industrial or commodity production, but rather via investment 
in services and trade (import and export) and in financial and real estate activities.
After the PNA takeover in 1994, more specifically after the second Intifada and 
the withdrawal of Yasser Arafat from the national political scene, resident and in-
coming Palestinian capitals became more active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
in their area of expertise: investment in services, trade and real estate. Before the 
PNA advent, in the period between 1948 and 1994, the active bourgeois seg-
ments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained captive to a certain extent of 
their local clan structure.
The two key elements that triggered the formation of the Palestinian middle class 
before the Oslo Accords were immigration outside the West Bank and Gaza and 
university education, both of which – until end 1980s – were conditioned by im-
migration.
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After the establishment of the Palestinian authority (with limited self-rule man-
date) in 1994, and subsequent regional and international transformations (col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and migration of Russian Jews into Israel, the Gulf War 
and Arab dismantling), a new engine of the class formation appeared in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.
In the aftermath of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the oc-
cupation state opened its (skilled and unskilled) hand labor markets, transforming 
the WBGS markets into prisoners of its commodities and reserve for cheap labor. 
With Israel’s control over crossing points and natural resources and settlement ex-
pansion, which dismembered the West Bank, agricultural activity was rapidly de-
pleted without any growth of local industries. Cultural capital owners and search-
ers were forced to opt for one choice, which is to immigrate. The high immigration 
rate did not decrease until the first Intifada and the Gulf War early 1991 and forced 
displacement of the Palestinian community in Kuwait with some returning to the 
territory occupied in 1967. This transformation coincided with Israel’s increased 
restrictions on labor of the Palestinians from WBGS in its labor market.
In 1948, the Palestinian people had lost their coastal cities and West Jerusalem. 
East Jerusalem became a secondary city as related to the City of Amman, the Jor-
danian capital, the modern urban city with appeal to investment, work and migra-
tion. With the increased immigration from West Bank cities – in 1950s until begin-
ning of 1990s – toward the Jordanian capital and Arab oil cities, less toward other 
cities in the world, Israel lost its status as a cultural and touristic site. To a certain 
extent, it also list its uniqueness as a location of cohabitation of multiple ethnic, 
religious, sectarian and national cultures.
In the aftermath of June 1967 war, Israel unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem and 
began a policy to alter the city’s geographic, demographic and architectural fea-
ture. It isolated it from its Palestinian Arab horizon by circling it with Jewish Israeli 
settlements, an apartheid wall and settlement expansion within the old city and 
surrounding Palestinian villages. It applied a slow ethnic cleansing policy against 
the Palestinian inhabitants. With cumulative Israeli restrictions to halt any (eco-
nomic, touristic, cultural or urban) expansion of East Jerusalem not to mention 
the additional obstacles imposed upon other Palestinian cities. West Jerusalem 
and Tel Aviv, until the first Intifada, were transformed into an appealing hub of 
shopping and entertainment for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
This situation continued until the first Intifada. 
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3. Palestinian Authority, the Engine of Birth of the City of Ramallah 
and Expansion of the Middle Class
This situation requires a review of the radical change of the City of Ramallah in 
particular, and Ramallah-Betonia community in general after the PNA established 
its headquarters in the city with Israel’s refusal to subject East Jerusalem to the 
control of the Palestinian Authority. The transformations of the City of Ramallah – 
which I will address later on – were mainly the outcome of this action and its sub-
sequent repercussions and not of specific characteristics that the city embraced 
for many decades, including the early immigration of its residents to the USA and 
its Christian communities with religious missionary schools, including the Friends 
Schools. The city also lived immigration of inhabitants of the cities and villages 
of Lud, Ramal and Jaffa following the Nakba of 1948 and its status as a touristic 
site under the Jordanian administration. All of such characteristics are important, 
but they are not exclusive to Ramallah. They actually apply to all or most other 
cities including Bethlehem (with its expansion into Beit Jala and Beit Sahour), and 
its Christian community and absence of any tribal hegemony over the city and 
its suburbs not to mention its fine weather and the immigration of many of its 
residents to the USA in the beginning of last century. It is also home of touristic 
religious and antiquity sites and very close to Jerusalem with old presence of reli-
gious missionaries’ schools. We may here refer to an interviewee in Ramallah who 
said that the absence of private capital to invest in Bethlehem, notwithstanding 
its touristic potential, is mainly attributed to the City’s week infrastructure since 
capital comes to invest after the construction of the infrastructure and not before. 
In this case the central authority (the Palestinian Authority here) is responsible for 
the rehabilitation of infrastructure (interview 21).
The detrimental factor that made Ramallah acquire its current function lies mainly 
in the settler colonialist state, which is comprehensively imposed upon the terri-
tory of historic Palestine to install the PNA (limited self-rule) institutions therein. 
It grew as the work and residential center of the servants of these institutions and 
other political leaders and cadres who have experienced living in metropolitan 
capitals like Beirut and Tunis. Some have even studied and trained in Eastern Eu-
ropean cities or in Cairo or Baghdad among other places. The presence of PNA 
institutions in Ramallah rendered the city a preferred choice for civil society or-
ganizations, political factions, international organisations and non-governmental 
organizations; it also became the new seat of banks and their branches and host 
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of telecommunication and insurance companies, publicity, hotel and recreational 
services in addition to trading activities (import, export and marketing). It attract-
ed incoming and local capital investment, which was mostly geared (mainly after 
the second Intifada) toward real estate development. Ramallah, with its political 
role, became also the seat of media, research, missionary and financial institu-
tions. 
Having said that, it does not mean that the history, location and social composi-
tion of Ramallah has no effect on what it became after 1994 (more specifically 
after 2005). It rather means that those were not the detrimental factors. It is nec-
essary to pay attention to the impact of the building of PA institutions on the 
existing power relations between the city, village and camp and among areas and 
zones within the city itself. Without understanding this transformation, it is not 
easy to explain the participation of the inhabitants of Ramallah (and other areas 
active in the first Intifada - and to a certain extent during the second Intifada - 
and the lack of collective action (in Ramallah and elsewhere) against what the 
Palestinians are collectively and individually facing in WBGS in terms of collective 
oppression, apartheid system and full control of most aspects of life.
To those who content themselves with attributing what happened in Ramallah to 
the state of globalization and urbanization, they must understand that globaliza-
tion and urbanization do not take place outside the structure of the society or 
outside the local, regional and international(political, economic, technological) 
power relations. They actually take place within these structure and relations in 
a context of settler colonization exercised by the State of Israel upon the territory 
occupied in 1967 (and in 1948).
Moreover, nothing proves that the middle class is the class embracing collec-
tively the values of modernity without scrutinizing the situation of this class with 
its components within its specific socioeconomic, cultural and political context. 
More specifically, if evidencing modernity via the adoption of practice of the val-
ues of freedom, equality and social justice, we have clear evidence that the Pal-
estinian middle class segments oppose, in practice and discourse, such values. 
same applies to the Jihadi Salafite segments and other proponents of the “sacred 
ignorance” and advocates of conservative streams that exploit and easily justify 
and opt for inequality in different forms. We find these segments of the middle 
class more in Ramallah-Albiereh, in comparison to other Palestinian cities and 
towns. We find them in the PA institutions, in stores, schools, universities, among 
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the leaders and senior staff of political factions, and in civil society organizations 
and other places.
The Palestinian middle class (and this seems to be the case of middles classes in 
most Arab countries) is a segment that stands out due to its consumption rather 
than production (at commodity, ideological, cultural, artistic or technological lev-
els). What differentiates it from its counterparts in productive societies is not only 
its scarce productive role, but also the fact that it works less than the average 
(mainly public sector servants). They enjoy more official and religious leaves and 
pay fewer taxes. Some categories under this class (mainly top subclasses) enjoy 
larger employment and promotion opportunities through their clientelist rela-
tions. Its distinctive feature is the consumption trend (computers, phones, cars, 
mobile phones, many instruments and medical devices and furniture) and its 
minimal role in producing what it consumes (mostly imported goods). This ap-
plies largely to the intellectual production. Our universities, for instance, depend 
on the knowledge produced by others while their production is rare. The rela-
tive exception remains in some cultural fields, which still preserve its uniqueness, 
namely in poetry, story-writing, visual art and performance arts. We also witness 
weak criticism and debate on the production of these fields. This mains poor eval-
uation of products. It is still a class that invests in cultural capital (higher education 
and fine culture), as see in race to university education, music learning, dedication 
to museums, poetry, novels and stories. We also see high turnover in visual art 
galleries, although partly to search of a symbolic capital or to mark social capital 
and differentiation.
With the PA creation, changes were not exclusive to the activities of local and 
incoming capital and expansion of consumption and social class differentiation. 
The political cultural has also shifted from praising the values of struggle, libera-
tion and resistance of the occupation to a culture of reconciliation with a con-
sumer’s individualist culture. The salient indicators of this culture in Ramallah are 
the widespread supermarkets, cafés, restaurants, gyms, hairdressers and wedding 
and graduation ceremonies. Add to this purchase of modern cars, large apart-
ments and top-notch mobile phones. This transformation in the political culture 
(or general mood) coincided with the bureaucratization of political parties after 
many of its senior staff enrolled in the self-rule authority institutions. They omit-
ted their militant resistance uniform to become the white collars in a ‘hierarchical’ 
institution. This was mainly the case of the two largest political factions in the Pal-
estinian political scene. (it would be enough to examine the signs of the “Hamas’s” 
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persistence to place its government servants in top PA management to under-
stand this transformation). This also coincided with the retreat of the role of the 
left parties and their voice and mobilization not to mention the shrinking of their 
social leaders. This transformation led to lack of socioeconomic accountability of 
political elites for their past and current roles.
4. Increased social, space and architectural disparity
Talking about the transformations lived by Ramallah necessitates an examination 
of the hierarchical and power relations that emerged among different areas after 
the PA takeover in terms of destruction of physical capital (cash and real estate) and 
sociocultural capital (which stems from political, institutional and clan relations) 
and symbolic capital (the remaining balance of the struggle record, for instance). 
This space/time hierarchy among different zones and neighborhoods appears in 
monitoring the distribution of different capitals and sources of power (influence) 
among the camps, villages and cities. More concretely, we find it between Um 
Alsharayet and Almasyoun, or between Ramallah Altahta (lower Ramallah) and 
Altiereh Alfouqa (Upper Tiereh). This generated a feeling of supremacy toward 
neighborhoods like Ramallah Altahtat5 and Ein Misbah and Qadourah and other 
poor neighborhoods. This increased with the “legitimization” of social disparity 
(extreme inequality) via capital mechanisms, as described by an interviewee.
A follower of the social reality of Ramallah comments, ‘the well-off live in Altiereh, 
Almasyoun and Alersal. Some have villas in the periphery of Ramallah in places 
like Surda or AlRiehand City. They have their own clubs in Altierh with member-
ship annual fees of 2000 Dollars per person. These well-offs are the rich of the 
Palestinian Authority and private sector (some of the members of the Boards of 
Directors of Banks are paid $ 100,000 a year, not to mention other benefits. Others 
in the private sector receive, as admitted by the said person, about half a million 
Dollars a year. Some are paid $ 34,000 a month in exchange of their positions in 
private-sector funded institutions. A chair of the board of directors of a private 
sector institution receives $ 1 million a year in addition to his shares. Some built 
5 Ramallah Altahtat (the Old City) started hosting popular restaurants and cafés (like Bandali, which is some-
times visited by the middle class) and other fancy and middle ones. It has bakeries, green grocers, wineries, 
spices sellers, bookstores and modern clothing shops in addition to money exchangers and a bank. It also has 
hairdressers, pharmacies, dentists’ clinics, butchers and institutes to teach ballet. It hosts moreover a small mu-
seum and a legacy center with handcrafters (tailors). There are no fancy villas in Ramallah Altahta but neither 
are their random buildings. However, it has poor people living in old houses. After the modernization of the 
old city’s infrastructure, it started having paved sidewalks with newly planted trees.
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their wealth by abusing of their positions in the public service. The PA president 
and 150 consultants have special budgets…” (Annex 3, interview 2).
It means it is necessary to monitor the engine behind the change in the balance of 
powers across space with the change of the political circumstances. For example, 
in the case of confrontations with the Israeli occupation, the social status (with the 
rise in the level of the symbolic capital) of Alamari Camp, Ramallah Altahta and 
Eign Misbah rises, if compared to neighborhoods like Althiereh and Almasyoun. 
This was the case during the Israeli incursion of Ramallah-Albiereh in 2002, as a 
result of the huge disparity in the ability and readiness to confront. Some (Annex 3, 
interview 18) mentioned a competition between Alamaari Camp and Ramallah Al-
tahta because of the different security apparatuses with the largest support in each 
area. Some noticed, “Altiereh witnessed a decrease in its social level because of the 
numerous tall buildings (40 apartments per building). Only its main street kept its 
standard. The so-called luxurious neighborhoods of Ramallah are Alasyoun (where 
land price is the highest) for residency and service-trade purposes. It now hosts 
the seat of large corporations (PADICO, banks and hotels) and the neighborhoods 
around the Muqatah, where Modern Ramallah Project is.” (Annex 3, interview 20)6. 
What merits our attention and contemplation is the social re-engineering of the 
space through purchase and sale of land and investment in housing and trade 
and multi-purpose buildings based on class criteria. Indeed, the middle class 
(more specifically its middle middle and upper middle subclasses) and capitalists 
(local bourgeoisie) occupied specific areas and residences that are detached from 
other zones or social classes areas. This is the case of Rawabi City and neighbor-
hoods like AlRiehan, Alyasmeen, and the Diplomatic Quarter and AlSafa Neigh-
borhood. However, the time and form of the architectural buildings of these new 
neighborhoods and buildings is different from what they used to be (before Oslo 
and the First Intifada). The place acquires a new time dimension. This is confirmed 
by the names given to these neighborhoods, streets, squares, restaurants, cafés, 
hotels and supermarkets.
We should also note the disparity in the class identity of the space as well as its 
gender dimension. For instance, women are not present in popular café, but this 
does not apply to coffee shops. The difference between the popular café and 
6 A Report published by Aman (September 2015), under the title of Report on the Financial Rights of Non-Ministry 
Public Institutions Officials and NGOs” referred to huge gaps in the pay across institutions operating in the West 
Bank, see: http://www.aman-palestine.org/ar/reports-and-studies/2586.html#sthash.AdWOUkMF.dpuf 
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coffee shops has a class dimension (in terms of price, décor, furniture and type 
of service). It also has a gender dimension. It also applies to the restrictions on 
mobility and world of children the (residential, school and public) space imposes 
in cities, mainly in Ramallah-Abiereh with the excessive expansion in residential 
apartments building (more like a can of sardine, as described by an interviewee). 
These multi-storey buildings, which increased – under the impact of existing reli-
gious extremism based on the severe segregation between the world of women 
and that of men) – the level of polarization between the private space and the 
public space, compared to the situation in villages, which did not live the effect 
of urban and residential expansion in apartments in multi-storey buildings. It is 
useful to recall that Israel imposed, mainly in cities, strict restrictions on the use of 
the public space for gathering and debate on national matters or for political and 
partisan activities or demonstrations and other forms of public resistance against 
the policy of the settler colonial state, which applies an apartheid regime.
The power relations allow Israel to enter with its army and security forces into 
Ramallah and impose restrictions on mobility; it enables it use the “clearance” tax 
revenues due to the PA for political blackmailing. This made many feel that the 
boom of the middle class (and real estate capital) in Ramallah is a mere ephemeral 
state. It is vulnerable to collapse at any time. This “existential” anxiety has its reper-
cussions on the ability of future planning of the city and its relations.
Ramallah is a city under occupation par excellence. It is entirely surrounded by 
settlements, bypass roads and checkpoints. Many of its citizens have been arrest-
ed in their homes. Israel will not give a second thought to arresting any individual 
at any time inside the city without any consideration whatsoever of the fact that 
it is the seat of the PA and an area “A”. The Israeli forces detained many city citizens 
and political readers of the main political factions and PLC members (as is the 
case of Marwan Barghouthi, the senior member of Fatah, two leaders of Hamas, 
and recently (in April 2015), PLC member and member of the political office of the 
PFLP, Khalida Jarrar).
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5. Ramallah and the Dream of the Liberal Palestinian City
Ramallah is the story told by its residents, workers, and visitors. It is the talk of 
journalists and new comers or those passing by. The most salient feature its rapid 
(horizontal and vertical) urban expansion, mainly after the second Intifada and 
after ministerial and municipal regulations allowing for increasing the number of 
floors n buildings (Annex 3, interview 26). With this expansion, Ramallah’s bank-
ing and service role inflated (with hotels, cafés, restaurants, shops, markets, tele-
communication and transportation), which effluent consumption and depletion 
of any shame of extravagance show off. In essence, the enigma of Ramallah lies in 
the true confrontation of the emergence of a Palestinian city after many decades 
of retention. A phenomenon that spawns various feelings, fears, expectations and 
suspicions considering the terms and circumstances under which this growth 
took place and the anxiety about its trajectory. Following are some examples of 
such feelings, suspicions, expectations and fears with contemplations of the feel-
ings that arose within those who narrated the city:
“Ramallah, Bride of Palestine”7
“Weird it is, Ramallah. Multi-cultured and multi-faced, it has not been a patriarchal 
or gloomy city. It has always led the way toward any new luxury. I watched the 
Dabkeh in Ramallah as if I were in Dier Ghassanah. I learned the Tango as a teen-
ager. I learned to pool in the Ankars Salon. I started my attempts into poetry. In 
this city, I developed my interest in cinematographic arts since the 1950s through 
the program of “Alwaleed” and “Dunia” and “Aljameel” Movie Theaters. In Ramal-
lah, I became used to celebrating Christmas and the New Year Eve.”8
“The Ramallah Syndrome is a side effect of the new social-spatial order, which 
emerged after the collapse of the “Oslo Peace Process”. It is a form of hallucina-
tions about what is normal and a fantasy (an illusion) of cohabitation with the 
occupation and freedom.”9
“Ramallah is an integral Part of the Israeli colonial Apartheid Bantustans, which 
are subjected to security control and economic dependency. Ramallah, like other 
Palestinian cities and villages, lived regressive social transformations including 
7 Title of a publication by Ramallah Municipality (in English) on the monthly cultural activities in the city’s facilities.
8  Albarghouthi, M., I saw Ramallah, Arab Cultural Center, Casablanca – Morocco, and Beirut-Lebanon, 2003, p. 48
9 See, the Ramallah Syndrome at:  (2009): http://ramallahsyndrome.blogspot.com/2009/10/ahdaf-soueif-on-
guardian.html
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the formation of social segments whose interests converge with the status quo. 
This coincided with the dissemination of a regressive culture and economic trans-
formations that deepened the dependency.”10
“Ramallah is the hub of the Palestinian night life: coffee shops, bars, salons, nu-
merous home parties… In the weekends, the traditional cafés are stocked with 
people smoking the hookah. We, the Palestinians, are a lively people; we love to 
sing and organize festivities… But the night life of a city under occupation is a 
complex story… The inhabitants of Ramallah are under restrictions and cannot 
easily travel to Jerusalem or other cities. This turned the city into a refuge, a kind 
of oasis. As such, it becomes problematic, a kind of mini Beirut. A place known as 
the bubble. It is the place where you flee the Palestinian reality…”11
“A distinguished civilized city, a green, safe and prosperous place, an environ-
ment-friendly zone that preserves the natural and cultural legacy with an appeal 
to tourism an investment, Ramallah hosts culture and arts with intellectual, politi-
cal and cultural pluralism and respect of human rights.”12
“The posters rendering homage to Palestinian Intifada Martyrs disappeared on 
the streets of Ramallah to be replaced with gigantesque advertisement banners 
marketing for mortgages. A town of the West Bank – the scene of Yasser Arafat’s 
last battle, the place where he was besieged in 2002 by Israeli tanks that wrecked 
off his quarters – was transformed into a small city open to the world with modern 
bars and luxurious houses.”13
“Now, Ramallah has grown into the administrative capital of the PA. It is no longer 
the song of “Lawee? Aa  Ramallah – where to? To Ramallah”. It is now the hub of 
the life of the Palestinians. Ramallah residents used to work in Jerusalem. Now, the 
Jerusalemites work in Ramallah and spend their evenings there. Holder of the title 
of poetry and a poem in a collection of poets (namely, Poet Mahmoud Darwish) 
said, “this is a rapidly growing city.” Others wrote about the “bubble of Ramallah” 
and another about “Ramallah the Blond”. A former Director of the French-German 
10 Abdelhamid, M., Demonization of Ramallah, (Series 1), Alayyam News Paper, 5 Feb 2013
11 Christina Ganim, “The insider›s cultural guide to Ramallah: ‹A misunderstood cosmopolitan bubble”, The 
Guardian 20the April 2015 (http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/20/insiders-guide-ramallah-misun-
derstood-cosmopolitan-bubble).
12 Annual Report, Ramallah Municipality, 2013
13 Bart, B., The Ramallah Dream, a Trip in the Heart of the PalestinianMirage, Dar Jarus Press, Tripoli – Lebanon, 
2013
22
A Reading  on the Socio Urban Changes in Ramalah and Kufur Aqab
Cultural Center, Gilles Karemer, wrote a different book praising the city. The es-
sence of this book, “what cannot be done in another Palestinian city is feasible in 
Ramallah. Years ago, a conference was held in Amman on cities. The French orga-
nized this conference to answer a side question about the definition of cities and 
a key issue in describing Ramallah. Is it a village? A city… Has it grown into a city? 
Had I been in this conference, I would have described it as a Town and administra-
tive capital. It is even the hub and metropolis of national life.”14
Indeed, this urban isle [Ramallah-Albiereh] appears at times closer to metropoli-
tan cities in the region – Amman, Cairo, Beirut and recently Dubai – than to similar 
cities and towns enclaved by the occupation. The outcome is that in this urban 
center, with a population of barely 60 thousand people, we find features that are 
similar (albeit at smaller scale) to major Arab cities that are much larger than Ra-
mallah. We find for instance the growing social disparity of the population with 
increased and normalization of social differences and the globalized hostile ethics 
drafted by the new middle class.”15
Ramallah is at 16 kilometers from Jerusalem and at 900 meters above sea level. It 
is uphill and referred to as the bride of Palestine in reason of its geographic aes-
thetic features. Ramallah has moderate and fresh weather. For many years, it was 
the preferred summer resort. Modern Ramallah is a lively city with museums, gal-
leries, theaters, parks, many restaurants and a nightlife. Ramallah is rapidly grow-
ing into a cosmopolitan city.16
“Is there any other town in the world where a young man – an indigenous know 
to his neighbors and surrounding – would bring six foreign women to his bed in 
less than a month but still covers his beer or wine bottle with black bags when he 
buys them? I don’t think this would happen in any place other than Ramallah, But 
the worse thing is that it is “occupied Ramallah”.17
What takes place in the alleys and streets of Ramallah Altahta, had taken place 
in the City center streets. They removed the rusty water pipes and built beautiful 
sidewalks with trees and new lighting. As such, they performed a “cardiac cath-
eterization” of the city heart and protected them against “myocardial infraction”. 
14 Albattal, H., Alayyam Newspaper, A more/ or less description of Ramallah?!, April 28th, 2015
15 Lisa Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis; the Paradoxical Case of Ramalla/Al-Bira”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 37; No. 
4 (summer 2008). P. 7
16 A photo leaflet on Ramallah and its surrounding, 2014 (in English), Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, Ramallah
17 From Yahai, A., Ramallah the Blond, Dar Alfiel, Jerusalem 2013
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You go for coffee in a coffee shop in Ramallah on the main street in the morning. 
In the evening, you go to Alinshirah café – Alsahl St. – in the old city. I am lucky to 
live in a city that is the heart of this Wet Bank. I am lucky to live in the bottom and 
inner old heart.”18
“In the aftermath of the signature of the Oslo accord, and with the advent of the 
National Authority on the Palestinian Territory, the prices of land soared. A public 
center created its seat in Ramallah whose buildings and residential zones barely 
sufficed the absorption of this demographic change. Consequently, investors and 
private sector companies invested madly in trade in land and construction of gi-
gantesque residential compounds, some of which hosted forty apartments. The 
striking feature of the buildings invading the city was their lack of uniform ar-
chitecture, color or setbacks compared to their neighbors. They also lacked any 
uniform system of collective services.”19
“The overwhelming feeling that mostly haunts me in Ramallah is that we are liv-
ing in a bubble that will explode one day. Many times, I feel suffocated. It is prob-
ably because I am new to the city and am not used to what should usually make 
me angry. Ramallah is an uphill city. In my old place (Almasyoun – Ramallah), I 
used to go out with my wife to walk at night. We would climb uphill and enjoy 
good mood and deep breath. This does not last long as you see the settlements 
with their bright lights overlooking the Prison of Ofar. You feel frustrated.”20
“In recent years, many literary works addressed the city of Ramallah. The first book 
was by Mureed Albarghouthi, under the title of “I Saw Ramallah”, published by Dar 
AlHilal, Cairo-Egypt, 1997. The second book by the same author was, “I was born 
there; I was born here.” (Part II of “I Saw Ramallah”, published by Dar Riyad AlRayyes 
for Publication and Printing, Beirut – Lebanon, 2009) and a novel “There are no An-
gels in Ramallah”, by young female author, Enas Abdallah, pulished by Dar Fadaat 
AlNashr, Amman – Jordan in 2010. Finally, there was a book, “Ramallah the dream… A trip 
into the Palestinian Mirage”, by journalist Benjamin Bart, writer to the French Le 
Mode and correspondent in the Palestinian Territory from 2002-2011.”21
18 Albattal, H., Cardiac Catheterization of Ramallah Altahta!, AlAyyam Newspaper, May 22nd, 2015
19 Farraj, Kh., “Ramallah, Global Village with everything”, Palestine Studies Review, issue 72, Autumn 2007, p 126
20 Alhindi, Kh. Dr., President of Birzeit University until summer 2015, “Khalil Hindi from Altantourah to Birzeit.”, 
Palestine Studies Review, Issue 98, spring 2014, p 149-174
21 Jardat, Mohammad, “Reading of Ramallah the Blond, novel by Abad Yahia, Dunia Alwatan, January 25th, 2013
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“Ramallah from here, from behind, resembles a refugee camp without any mod-
ern engineering or design. It is a large squatter with too much cement. All of the 
cities of the West Bank started to look like refugee camps without any general 
engineering or planning. Each one builds what he wants, which made the cities of 
the West Bank look like camps or a car parking!!”22
6. Ramallah between the Self-Rule Condition and the Settler Coloni-
zation
Probably the most important event in the modern history of Ramallah (together 
with Albiereh) was the creation of the Palestinian Authority and its choice of Ra-
mallah as its seat. Upon its takeover in 1994, the National Authority was the first 
Palestinian rule known to the city (although with limited self-rule mandate). The 
PA headquartered in Ramallah-Albiereh under the assumption that this would 
a temporary procedure until the establishment of the independent Palestinian 
state with its capital, Jerusalem. This was supposed to take place in a short period 
(defined as five years, i.e. in 1999) and that there would be a shift toward a state via 
bilateral negotiation with Israel (being the occupying state). However, this did not 
happen even after two decades of negotiations. We can say that it is not expected 
to happen in the near future taking due to ongoing intense settler colonization 
control of the West Bank and the suffocating siege on the Gaza Strip. However, 
the failure to establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital qualified 
Ramallah to play the role of the political, economic, financial, administrative and 
cultural center of the Wet Bank. Therefore, some see what happened to Ramallah 
as a “side effect” of the failure of the project to create the Palestinian state. Others 
see it as the result of the creation of a Palestinian authority for the first time on its 
territory. Since Ramallah as grown into the political, security, administrative and 
economic seat of the leadership, Israel dealt with it with relative specificity, com-
pared to other zones, which produced other phenomena that I will address later. 
It is an illusion that it is a city beyond the control of the occupation and safe from 
the hegemony of the settler colonizing state.
As in many other Palestinian areas, the Nakba effect was dramatic on the then 
small Ramallah. Immigration of Ramallah residents outside Palestine increased 
while it received scores of Palestinian refugees coming mainly from Jaffa, Lud and 
Ramalah. In 1944 (that is 4 years before the Nakba) the population of Ramallah 
22 Allaham, N., “And Ramallah, from Behind, Looks Like a Refugee Camp”, Maan News Agency, May 24th, 2015
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reached 6300 persons with the following sectarian distribution: 3570 Greek Or-
thodox, 700 Roman Catholic, 1080 Latin, 325 Protestants, 200 Friends, 425 Mus-
lims. The same source reports that the population of Ramallah in 1952 (five years 
after the Nakba) was: 4500 native population (less by 1800 of its levels nine years 
before), expatriates 2580, refugees and new comers 9000, making the total popu-
lation around 13500. The refugees (of the Nakba) represented in that year two 
thirds of the population of Ramallah.23
In 1997, the population of Ramallah City was 17851, and increased to 27092 in 
2007 (PCBS). The population of Albiereh was 37690 and Betonia 19496, making 
84278 capita in this tripartite urban zone. The population in Ramalah in 2015 ws 
estimated at 34173, and Albiereh at 47540 and Betonia at 24592, making a total 
of 106305.24 These are estimates and some believe – as others believed in 2007 
– that the population of Ramallah is much higher. This is probably due to the dif-
ference between the number of residents and number of visitors who come to 
the city to work, shop or seek medical treatment and other services from neigh-
boring villages and from the Palestinians inside the Green Line. It is natural that 
the number of users of the twin city (Ramallah-Albeireh) exceeds the number of 
its residents. The city provides diversified (health, commodity, administrative, rec-
reational, educational and sporting) services that different social segments need 
(popular and middle classes and capital holders and businesspersons). Consider-
able villages are part of the Governorate of Ramallah – Albiereh and they need 
the services provided by the city. It should be noted that these villages do not fall 
under the rural definition since only a small percentage depend on agriculture. 
They are villages in terms of social relations (the strong role of clan and neighbors 
relations).
Although it has special importance, the population of Ramallah is not significant 
by its number but rather by its generation of new social needs and relations. What 
matters here is the social, professional, and cultural composition of the residents 
and workers in the place and those using it. The existing diversity in the compo-
sition of inhabitants of Ramallah is not a new thing. However, the consequence 
of the creation of the Palestinian Authority and choice of its headquarters in Ra-
mallah influenced the professional, cultural, political and ideological diversity in 
terms of life experiences, artistic and architectural taste and increasingly pushed 
23 On Demographic, Clan and Institutional History of Ramallah until Early 1980s, see Shaheen, A., Unveiling Ances-
tors and Clans of Ramallah, Documentation and Research Center, Birzeit University, 1982 (p 21-22)
24 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (see Annex 2)
26
A Reading  on the Socio Urban Changes in Ramalah and Kufur Aqab
it away from the engines of social relations in surrounding villages (including fam-
ily, neighbors, age groups, gender, ownership and forms of capital). 
Therefore, the enigma of Ramallah is largely connected to the formation and oc-
cupations and aspirations of the Palestinian middle class25, which represents the 
professional, political, cultural and economic majority in the city and its suburbs. 
Within this middle class, some find in Ramallah the necessary space of personal 
freedom and respect of privacy and who prefer that their privacy be respected 
and not trespassed. This relative respect of privacy is partly attributable to the ab-
sence of clan (tribal) hegemony on individual behavior in the city. Some consider 
that “with the absence of the clan, everybody endeavors to build his/her own 
world” (Annex 3, interview 9). Others view Ramallah as “Sodom and Gomorrah”, 
because of the corruption, immorality and undermining of ethical and national 
values they see.26 It is a class with subclasses that find in Ramallah the fulfillment 
of their cultural, artistic, intellectual and political interests; and with others who 
are happy with its stores, hotels, restaurants, cafés and other leisure and enter-
tainment. The streets in the daytime are crowded with pedestrians and vehicles, 
conveying a sense of existence in the city. One of our interviewees, a worker on 
the Rukab Street, says, “the streets of Ramallah are overcrowded because of the 
increase in the rented or owned multi floor buildings with their commercial shops, 
25 On the Characteristics and Features of the Palestinian Middle Class in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, see Hilal, J., 
“The Palestinian Middle Class in the Face of the Challenges of Political Fragmentation and intellectual-cultural 
Laziness and Conservative Trend.”, Palestinian Papers, Issue 3, Summer 2013
26 This is what critics of Abad Yahya’s novel, Ramallah the Blond (Dar Alfeel, Jerusalem 2013) found. See Muhanad 
Abdelhamid’s review of the novel in three parts under the title of “Demonization of Ramallah”, published in Aa-
layyam Newspaper on February 5th, 12th and 19th, 2013. In the third part he concluded that the novel belongs 
to “a cultural yet regressive and conservative culture. This appears in the stances and concepts defended or 
explicated in the novel. It is not a disgrace of Ramallah to host diversified cultural activities, some of which are of 
fine class while others are a degradation. Still, most of them are useful since culture boosts social development 
and openness to human creativity. It is a forum to criticize politics and politicians. The Palestinian culture has 
always played a role of resistance against the occupation notwithstanding the current fragility of the cultural 
elites. It is still necessary to note that a political collapse may happen while culture and its components shall 
remain resilient. Every country has several cultures. When the political criticism depends on regressive culture, 
it loses its strengths and shifts its supporters to the right of those it criticizes. This is what we see in “Ramallah 
the Blond”> some read a different text in this novel. For instance, the Dean of the Department of Sociology 
and Humanities in Birzeit University, Dr. Abaher AlSaqqa thinks, “the novel reflects the hysterical state lived by 
Ramallah, compared to Gaza the Black or Red of today.” Al Saqa sees that the novel is narrating the contradiction 
between the local and the cosmopolitan and talks about many social changes taking place in the city. It narrates 
the contradictory spaces and all new phenomena in a smooth pleasant way. We all recall our localism in this 
city, which with days stops resembling us. The novel addresses one of the most controversial issues of Ramallah, 
namely the foreign presence. It monitors the details of life, architecture, identity policies and relation with the 
Palestinian diaspora. Abad Yahya goes through this spectrum starting with Slavoj Zizik to reach the sellers of 
coffee around the city.” (Haq Alawda Newspaper, issue 51, Badil (the Palestinian Center for the Sources of Citizen-
ship and Refugees Rights). See https://www.badil.org/haq-alawda/item/1867-art13
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clinics, labs technical offices. It also receives shoppers from neighboring villages 
and visitors who simply come for a “walk”, in addition to political faction staff and 
security apparatuses staff.” .27
The city also has significant social segments who strive to secure their daily bread, 
and young people who find it pleasant to “ride” in recent cars and move from one 
coffee shop to another and from one restaurant to another (whose prices deter 
most social segments). They go from one club to another, from a 4-star hotel to a 
50star hotel. Others barely have a capital of a few hundreds of shekels, which they 
use to sell small items on the street for a few shekels. They tour the city streets and 
sidewalks. It is necessary to recall this to those who easily generalize the happen-
ings of this “premature” city, as an interviewee describes it. It is a reminder to those 
who flatten the city by connecting it to the authority and misconduct.
On the sidewalks of Ramallah, we find salesmen with seasonal goods like cakes, 
strawberry, drinks, green almonds, stewed wheat, chestnut, humus, foul, coffee 
and sellers of books, CD’s, DVD’s, religious books and popular stories. We also find 
greengrocers selling seasonal produce like zucchini, tomatoes, cucumber, mint, 
parsley, mallow, chicory and other)… there is also the permanently crowded 
market of vegetables and fruit. Its streets are always full of taxis, a mix of places 
(restaurants including fast food like KFC, popular cafés, fancy coffee shops whose 
prices overmatch European cities). There also stores with local, Arab or foreign 
names. On the sidewalks of Ramallah, we find the poor from villages marketing 
what they still produce or do not produce.
Ramallah (together with Albiereh) is not exclusive to middle class and business-
persons. It also has Almaari camp, Qadura Neighborhood, and the camps of Aljal-
azon and Qalandia. It is home of the poor of Ramallah Altahta and Um Alsharayet 
where the lower middle class lives. The street of Rukab is rarely without beggars 
on the sidewalks. In its neighborhoods, some knock at doors and offices to ask for 
help directly or indirectly (by selling religious books).
27 Ramallah is a market of variant goods and services, popular restaurants (for humus, foul and falafel, also fre-
quented by the middle class to buy or have breakfast, mainly on Fridays and to a lesser extent on Sundays. In 
recent years, fast food restaurants and 3+ star hotels (Grand Park, Caesar, Ankars Suites, Royal Court, Alhajal, 
Beauty-Inn, Casablanca, City-Inn, Movenpick, Merador (in Altiereh) in addition to specialized clinics, pharmacies, 
labs, hospitals, money exchangers, supermarkets and malls. It also has movie theaters, clothing stores, jewelers, 
hairdressers, car parking and depot of the public transport taking passengers to different parts of the West Bank.
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7. Ramallah: Urban Sprawl, sign of aliveness or sign of mirage28?
A female pharmacist in Ramallah Altahta told me that the citizens of Ramallah 
who come to visit in the summer say they no longer recognize their city because 
of the tremendous changes that took places. There are new buildings, lights and a 
nightlife that – in their words – exceeds what they see in America. This is an exag-
geration used to reiterate the level of change that took place in the city over the 
past two decades. But, based on my own experience and the interviews I conduct-
ed, it is quite true if we compare Ramallah today with the city before the advent 
of the Palestinian Authority.
There is no doubt that Ramallah witnessed in the last decade an increase in the 
construction of multi storey buildings for housing or work purposes (offices, clin-
ics and labs) or for use as government premises, or for banks, different compa-
nies or nongovernmental or civil society organizations. Obviously, the number 
of coffee shops, restaurants and hotels has doubled29 after the second Intifada 
and the passing away of President Yasser Arafat. Some used “globalized”30 names. 
Cinemas, Taxi service and all other vehicles are back into the streets of the city. The 
daytime population of Ramallah is double (according to some estimates, includ-
ing municipal staff) its nighttime residents because of the number of comers to 
the city for work, shopping, treatment and official business in daytime.
The urban and demographic sprawl and diversified urban feather is the engine of 
the Ramallah enigma. This includes the enigma of a new architectural language 
and the new concept of housing forced by the funds from the Gulf and control 
of the private sector, which grew as part of the city’s typography. Some consider 
this like a bubble doomed to explode while others see Ramallah going on the 
footsteps of large Arab cities like Beirut, Amman and Dubai.31 (Many interviewees 
spoke of the influence of Amman and Gulf states’ life style and architectural pat-
28 The term Palestinian Mirage of Ramallah appeared in Bejamin Bart’s book, The Dream of Ramallah, A Trip in the 
Heart of the Palestinian Mirage, Dar Jarous Press, Tripoli, Lebanon, 2013.
29 A press report on Ramallah in the late 2014 states that the number of coffee shops and restaurants in the city, 
according to the Ramallah City Information Sheet, has exceeded 4000. See Saed Abu Farha, “The Quarrel of the 
Past and the Present over a Table, the Story of the Café and the Authority in Ramallah”, Annex to Alsafeer News-
paper, October 2014. http://palestine.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=3098. To get more information on the 
different activities in Ramallah and other areas, see the monthly review. This Week in Palestine
30 Some of these restaurants and hotels have English names, like the original brand. They include Pizza Hut, KFC, 
Checkers, Dominos, Mövenpick Hotel, Caesar, Grand Park, Best Eastern, Royal Court Suites, Beauty-Inn, etc.
31 Bisharah, Kh., draft unpublished paper, idem.
29
Ramallah, the City and its Story
tern on Ramallah. Some believe that the happenings of Ramallah are the transla-
tion of political agendas and convergence of multiple local, regional and national 
interests.
The enigma of Ramallah lies largely in the secret of its transformation from a 
multi-sectarian touristic town with relative high immigration and a summer resort 
into a city or town with clear urban features. Ramallah lived an urban sprawl that 
has – over a very short time – transformed its typography through vertical and 
horizontal expansion and intensification and diversification of institutions and ac-
tivities. This happened and is still happening with the presence of the Palestinian 
Authority (limited self-rule) alongside the apartheid settler control of the coloniz-
ing state and neo-liberal economic system.
The well-off political, economic and culture elites of Ramallah do not hide the im-
age they want to present of the city. This is obvious in the institutions and facilities 
they reside in and the activities celebrated by the city. Ramallah hosts the Pales-
tinian prime ministry and seats of different PA ministries and agencies including 
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the Palestinian Land Authority 
(PLA) and premises of different private sector companies, international and civil 
society and nongovernmental organizations. It has also numerous cultural insti-
tutions created during or after the first Intifada (mostly after the Oslo accords) 
including the Ramallah Cultural Palace and Mahmoud Darwish Museum32, Tamer 
Community Education Institute (established in 1989), Abdelmohsen Alqattan 
Foundation (established post Olso), Muwaten, MAS, MADAR, Palestine Studies In-
stitute, Riwaq (located in Albiereh but refers to its address as in Ramallah), Edward 
Saeed Music Conservatory, Kamanjati, Popular Art Center (Albiereh), Sariyat Ra-
mallah, Alqasaba Theater, French-German Cultural Center, mausoleum and mu-
seum of Yasser Arafat, Alsakakini Cultural Center, in addition to many clubs, sports 
associations, human rights and women organizations and labor unions. Add to all 
this a crowd of globalized restaurants, cafés and hotels not to mention “malls” and 
“supermarket” (with Arabic and foreign names) and taxi service.
32 According to the Ramallah Municipality, the Cultural Palace was established in 2005. It was planned and imple-
mented by the Municipality of Ramallah and UNDP with generous support from the Government of Japan. 
(See Municipality leaflet titled “Presenting the Facilities of the Municipality of Ramallah, in Arabic and English. 
Undated. The same leaflet presents the importance  of other sites including the Barwa Garden/ Mahmoud Dar-
wish Museum, which opened in 2012 in cooperation between the Ramallah Municipality, the Prime Ministry and 
Mahmoud Darwish Foundation, and the mausoleum and museum of Arafat (2014).
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The names given to the streets in Ramallah (placed at the entrances of streets and 
crossroads in recent years) reveal the keenness to give the city a secular pluralist 
inclusive identity (with overwhelming male names) and an Arab and international 
dimensions. This appears on the following names in random order33
Khalil Sakakini, Edward Saeed, Emile Habibi, Yahia Ayyash (Habibi and Ayyash 
corss at Almasyoun), Philip Hatti, Khalil Albedieri, Fawzi Alqawiqji, Emile Azar, Ben 
Bella, Issa Ziyadah, Kamal Udwan, Khalil Abu Rayya, Ahmad Sidqi Aldajani, Is’af 
Alnashashibi, Ibrahim Touqan, Khalil Alwazir, Mukhles Amro, Jabra Alashqar, Man-
sour Rayyan, Michael Angelo, Mother Teresa, Hanna Michael, Ghassan Kanafani, 
Lina Alnabulsi, Fayez Sayegh, Saad Sayel, Nicolas Shehada, Newton, Tolstoy, Raf-
faili Cireillo (an Italian journalist who martyred during the incursion), Albukhari, 
Alkindi, Alfarabi, Mar Andraus, Friends, Labeeb Ni’mah, Dier Alrum, Alanarah, Bint 
Jbiel, Almasayef, Naji Alali, Moeen Besseiso, Mustapha Aldabbagh, Nizar Qab-
bani, Almuntazah, Sameeh Farsoun, Mohammad Yousef Alnajjar, Henry Ketten, 
Almajdal, Dar Ibrahim, Ein Misbah, Dar Oudeh, Zanoubia, Louis Aragon, Saint Pe-
ter, Falasteen, Lebnan, Tokyo, Brazil, Alhend, Berlin, Janoub Afriqia, Hanoi, Yaffa, 
Alquds and Gaza.
The same applies to the names of squares (at the crossroads of the streets of the 
city), which come with names like: Yasser Arafat, King Abdalla, Asra Alhuriah, 
Alshabab, Abu Ali Mustapha, Nelson Mandela, Heider Abdelshafi Kareem Khalaf, 
Aziz Shehada, George Habash.
Ramallah Municipality also reiterates its position as a sponsor of public cultural 
activity and responsible for cleaning the streets and safeguarding the environ-
ment. It launched in 2015 a project to recycle carton and papers not to mention 
the rehabilitation of new areas of the roads and sidewalks and planting trees in 
many areas including in Ramallah Altahta.
In the same time, we notice that the private sector – usually using the owners’ 
names – tends to give its housing units (which target the lower and middle sub-
classes of the middle class) with names that are time and space irrelevant to the 
Palestinians. Ribhi Alhijjah housing projects for instance are called Kuala Lumpur, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Seville, Grenada, Ratel, Yousef building. They also include Is-
33 The names of the streets were chosen by a committee of the city figures, assigned by the Municipality. A taxi 
driver told me, ‘many of these names are strange to us. Albiereh Municipality did better because it named the 
streets with the names people used.”
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tanbul, and Clementia. As for Niballi Real Easte, their projects are called Ras Al-
naqourah, Antalia, and Izmir. Ribhi Alhajjah Projects also have names like Ahmad 
Project, and Samarkand. Alfares and Alnabali chose names like Saida, Fas, Mekka, 
Alqasreen, Riyadh, Petra, Qasr Abu Dhabi, Cartage, Jeddah, the Andalusia Villas, 
Agadir, Dubai, Juniah, Algeria and Samera34. The widespread use of Islamic names 
or names of Islamic states’ capitals made some say that the new buildings in Ra-
mallah-Albiereh are owned by Islamists, adding “and targeted the corrupted of 
the PA” (Annex 3, interview 5).
8. Why is Ramallah an Exception?
Many factors made Ramallah the exception among the cities of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, most importantly – as previously mentioned – its selection by the PA as 
its seat since Israel prevented that such seat be in Jerusalem. This step led to many 
deliberate and accidental transformations that can be told as such:
I. The outcome of the Oslo Accord was the return of tens of thousands of Pal-
estinians with variant experiences and specializations, most of whom lived in 
Arab and non-Arab cities. They had worked in the PLO institutions and factions 
in Arab cities (Beirut, Damascus, Tunisia) and some studied or worked in Pales-
tinian diplomatic missions in socialist countries and some western capitals. Be-
cause the cities (more precisely the towns) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had 
limited growth after the Nakba, most of the returnees were disappointed with 
the reality in these Palestinian cities-towns.35 This repulsion between “returnee” 
and “resident” appeared more specifically before the second Intifada. With the 
international, regional and local changes in the last three decades, the “secular” 
stream that hegemonized the PLO factions and institutions and adopted a de-
fensive way and slowly retreated before the influence of “Hamas” and the other 
political Islam forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and other Palestinian 
communities. This transformation coincided with the relapse of the influence 
of the Palestinian left in the society and Islamic forces influence inside Fatah, 
which became more ready to be influenced by the Islamic stream discoursed.. 
 
34 Names taken from the marketing brochures of different housing projects implemented by various companies.
35 See for instance, Alustah, Adel, “Literature of the Returnees – Disappointment of the Returnees”, Alayyam ews-
paper, May 10th, 2015
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strong and effective presence of the political Islam appeared in the 2006 elec-
tions with Hamas winning the PLC elections. Ramallah was not isolated from the 
escalation of Political Islam and the decrease in the influence of the left and secu-
lar cultures, mainly after the passing away of Arafat in 2004. Large segments of 
the middle class coped with the ethics and tastes of the Islamic Stream. Probably, 
Hamas’s victory in the elections of the students’ council of Birzeit University (the 
most secular and liberal university of the WBGS) in April 2015 asserts that the Is-
lamic stream still enjoys wide influence among the middle class segments.
II. The split between Fatah and Hamas in 2007 provided the city of Ramallah with the 
opportunity to present itself as an open and liberal city that detaches itself from 
the politics between the two major factions. Probably Fatah and Hamas (each for 
its own reasons) found this suitable and the PA institutins and Fatah the image of 
supporter of liberalism, openness and pluralism as opposed to Hamas. Indeed, 
Hamas’s attitude as a de facto authority in Gaza projected a totally different image 
and granted Hamas’s presence in the West Bank a refuge among human rights 
organizations and the PLC against PA procedures. Starting with this entry point, 
we can say, as told me an interviewee, that Ramallah is the child of Fatah (Annex 
3, interview 16). This identity actually dismantled the attempt of Islamic forces to 
change the name of the city of Ramallah because it has the name “Allah” in it and 
enabled the municipality stand against this attempt. 
III. In practice, Ramallah – because of Israel’s position – became the political and 
administrative capital of the PA. the Israeli restrictions on urban expansion 
outside Areas “A” ad “B” (20% of the West Bank without taking the settlements 
into account) and the PA and private sector’s need to establish premises and 
housing for workers and job seekers sent land prices skyrocketing. Therefore, a 
wave of investment by the private sector began in trade in land and construc-
tion of huge housing compounds, some of which had forty apartments each.36 
This is an indicator that the key party defining and benefiting from the urban 
expansion of Ramallah and building patters, sites and sizes of public areas was 
the private capital. In other words, the political and civil society did not have 
much influence on the decisions related to urban expansion of the city or its 
features. This does not mean that Ramallah Municipality did not play any role, 
but its role was limited to narrow areas. it should be noted that Ramallah, simi-
36 See reportage by Khaled Farraj, “Ramallah, Global Village with Everything”, Palestine Studies Review, issue 72, 
Autumn 2007
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lar to other Palestinian cities, is enclaved by settlements and bypass roads. This 
explains the rush to urban expansion in manners different from the traditional 
Palestinian architecture (one or two-storey houses). However, this would not 
have taken place in this manner had it not provided job opportunities for large 
segments of the middle class of Ramallah-Albiereh and its suburbs. The need 
for housing in Ramallah-Albiereh, which arose following the second Intifada 
and the subsequent restrictions, imposed by Israel on mobility within and in-
tra cities, forced many to come daily to work in public and private sector in-
stitutions. They needed dwellings near their workplace in Ramallah-Albiereh 
(including in Um Alsharayet) and constituted an incentive for investment in 
multi-floor housing compounds to make cost effective use of the expensive 
land.
IV. The PA establishment came with growth of the modern private sector (banks, 
telecommunication, insurance companies, media and health, legal and social 
services). This triggered growth of the private sector in number and share of 
the labor force stemmed by the needs of the PA (being the Public sector) and 
the private sector in general and specialized staff in many areas. In the after-
math of the Oslo Accord the number of NGOs increased as well as the number 
of freelancers (doctors, engineers, lawyers, dentists). Moreover, the number of 
universities, colleges and private schools rose and needed more teachers, staff 
and students.
This rapid and wide growth in the size of the middle class in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, mainly in cities, especially in Ramallah-Albiereh, where the middle 
class represents 20% of the labor force (Annex 2), introduced a radical shift in 
the class composition, which until the first Intifada was mainly geared by the 
working class “proletariat”. This actually resulted from the fact that many work-
ers found job opportunities in Israel and its settlements, while immigration 
(toward Gulf states, Jordan, Europe and USA) contributed to the emergence of 
a Palestinian middle class outside the territory occupied in 1967. This middle 
class is differentiated from other classes (including the small bourgeoisie or 
owners of small capital and businesspersons) by its reliance on the ownership 
of a cultural capital (high educational attainment and fine specializations) in 
generating income, social status and a particular lifestyle for itself.37 After the 
37  For detailed discussion on the concept of middle class and its Palestinian expressions in terms of composition and 
internal features and differences, see Jameel Hilal, the Palestinian Middle Class, Search on the Chaos of Identify, 
Reference and Culture, Muwatin – the Palestinian Institute for Democracy Studies, Palestine Studies Institute, 2006
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First Intifada, the Gulf War and the Oslo Accord, Israel devised labor restrictions 
on the Palestinians in its labor market, and employment with the PA, private 
sector and civil society institutions was open to form a new middle class, which 
has relative weigh and influence._
What distinguishes Ramallah from other Palestinian cities is beyond the fact 
that its demographic growth rates (compared to the size of the population) 
is the highest. It actually includes other aspects including the urban sprawl 
that invaded the city in the last decade with multi-purpose buildings and 
housing compounds (ministerial headquarters, seats of international orga-
nizations, hotels, offices, clinics, restaurants and coffee shops, labs, schools, 
colleges, stores, cultural and research centers and NGOs). In addition there is 
this vertical and horizontal expansion to the extent allowable in Areas “A” and 
“B” and as permissible by municipal plans and capital investment. The urban 
expansion dwelled in the different parts of the city and its suburbs including 
the city center and old city.38 Still, the most salient feature of Ramallah is its 
population diversity in terms of origin (Gaza, north and south and middle 
West Bank), and its political, professional, social and cultural diversity. This 
aspect is highly cherished by official and civil institutions and they endeavor 
to highlight it.
V. Ramallah is also distinguished from other cities and towns by its enthusiasm to 
present itself as the city for all Palestinians (regardless of their place of birth). 
To a certain extent, it stands up to this image if we ignore the sharp dispar-
ity of wealth and authority among its citizens. This particularity stems from 
deliberate effort of the city’s leaders to present it as a pluralist city in terms of 
respect of plurality of political, ideological and religious beliefs and respect of 
privacy. To a certain extent, it is as such, which is a feature commended by the 
interviewees and the municipality. The city is open to different cultures and 
lifestyles, but because it is interwoven with Albiereh (the more conservative 
in terms of social relations) and the social and cultural diversity of its inhabit-
ants and daily visitors, it remains cautions, as demonstrated by the fate of “Biet 
38 The reconstruction and urban expansion efforts included the street of Rukab where some old one-floor build-
ings were demolished to be replaced by multi-storey buildings for offices like Al-lulua, Ziyada, Alnatshe, and 
Dnia Commercial center buildings and Alzumurudah. This also applies to Alshal St in Ramallah Altahta and Alir-
sal St., in addition to many housing and non-housing buildings in different parts of Ramallah and the construc-
tion of entire neighborhoods in the suburbs of Ramallah.
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Aniesah”39 and women’s fear to publicly date a man. It is a city that presents it-
self as a place combining the local and the globalized. It is pretty much as such 
in appearance, consumerism and services and in terms of the names chosen 
by its restaurants, hotels, stores (ranging from Darna and Jududuna to Zamn 
and Michael Angelo, Azur, Prunto, Fainting and many others). The city dwells in 
addition to PA and NOGs headquarters, the seat of Arab and foreign embassies 
and consulates and international organizations, during the summer, it receives 
thousands of its expatriates from the USA and other areas and welcomes their 
investment in the city and its suburbs and their donations for its developmen-
tal efforts.
VI. With the redeployment of the Israeli occupation forces to zones beyond its 
boundaries, and the presence of a high percentage of middle class, Ramallah 
(probably more than any other cities) witnessed multiple public spaces that 
provide room for public dialogue and discussion. It also hosts regular confer-
ences and meetings of think tanks including Muwaten, Masarat, MAS, Pales-
tine Studies Institute, Madar, Abdelmohsen Alqattan, Birzeit University, Riwaq 
and others in the areas that influence the Palestinian public opinion and PA 
policies.  Its libraries receive many Arab reviews published in Beirut, and Cairo. 
It is also the center of local radios and TVs and Arab and international stations. 
Moreover, it holds art exhibitions and poetry salons and cinema and novel eve-
nings (mainly in Mahmoud Darwish Museum).
Consistent with its history as a summer resort before the Israeli occupation 
Ramallah presents itself as a touristic city with different star hotels although it 
lacks (if we exclude its weather in summer time) touristic attractions (archaeo-
logical, religious and quality cultural). Moreover, its green areas have decreased 
over the past two decades and Israel prohibits any access thereto – similar to 
other occupied territory – by citizens of Arab states. Palestinians under the oc-
39 In an article published by the Lebanese Safir Newspaper, it was written “who is the most famous woman of 
Ramallah” The answer is easy: Aniesah, but not for her academic, artistic or even political achievements. Ramal-
lah is rather known for its famous bar and discotheque in the PA Territory, the so-called “Biet Anieseh”, more 
specifically in Ein Menjed neighborhood. When you come near the place, you will find a group of security guards 
recruited from a private company. You would imagine that when you enter the space, you would find women 
spread here and there waiting for a client to pick one for the night. No, it is not the case, Biet Anieseh is not a 
place for sex sellers. It is a bar and a restaurant that turns after 10 Pm into a discotheque where dancers scream 
loudly and come out drunk after midnight. Neighbors would wake up to the voice of those leaving the bar to 
the extent that the submitted a complaint to the mayor after which the discotheque was shut for a long period. 
People rumored that the place was shut against a difference between an “incoming” client and the owner of the 
place (Islam Alsaqqa, Alsafeer, January 13th, 2014, see http://shabab.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=8482
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cupation cannot travel to the Mediterranean. Still, we find interest in develop-
ing tourism with a tourist’s center named Ramallah Tourism Information Cen-
ter in an old building in Ramallah Altahta near the new Ramallh Municipality. 
Riwaq and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) renovated 
the building. Moreover, the French Foreign Ministry and City of Bordeaux sup-
port the operation of the center in cooperation with Ramallah Municipality. We 
find a map of the streets of the city with signs showing its key monuments on 
the wall of this beautiful building in English. This is an indication that interest 
is focused on external tourism as well and not limited to domestic tourism. We 
also notice brochures of the city issued by the municipality ignoring the near-
by Palestinain refugee camps (Alamaari and Aljalzone) or small inner camps 
like Qadoura (probably because it is not registered officially as a camp) or Ein 
Misbah and other poor areas of the city. It mentions the Park of Qadura, which 
is a lovely small garden near the small camp.
VII. Ramallah presents itself as a custodian of culture and hosts a number of cul-
tural center (Ramallah Cultural Palace, Mahmoud Darwish Museum, Sakakini 
Cultural Center, Qasaba Theater and Cinemateque, among others). It also has 
art galleries, research centers, theaters and cinemas. The city was keen to build 
“Ramallah Martyrs’ Site” with a mosaic mural by artist Nabeel Anani in a quarter 
inside the old city. It also has a holed iron calligraphy of a poem by Mahmoud 
Darwish about martyrs: “when the martyrs go to sleep, I wake up, I guard them 
against lamenting lovers, I tell them, ‘may you wake up in a homeland with 
clouds and blood”.40 At the entrance to Alsahl St., still stands a memorial of 
the prisoners and liberated prisoners (although it degraded with time) at the 
crossroad of Jafa St. and Alsahl St. It also has a verse of a poem by Mahmoud 
Darwish saying, “we shall love life so long as we can find a way thereto.”  
VIII. Ramallah and Albiereh are differentiated by their own municipal establish-
ments although visually, it is difficult to tell their boundaries41, still the person-
al freedom is differentiated in each part. Some believe this is due to the Chris-
40 The poem was curved but had a lingo error. Journalist Hassan Albatal alerted the Municipality in his daily col-
umn in Alayyam (April 28th, 2015). The Municipality should be commended for immediate response to correct 
the error.
41 An interviewee I talked to reported the following incident in his residential area: “Ghassan Kanafani St. (in 
Qadoura Neighborhood) is a narrow road. Half of the street is within the boundary of Ramallah Municipality 
while the other half is part of Albiereh. Each municipality cleans its part of the street but at different times. This 
means that waste, with minimum wind, may travel from one side to the other (an area of a few meters). This 
situation pushed the residents of the neighborhood to intervene with both municipalities to clean the street 
in the same time.”
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tian minority (which used to be the majority before) with its different sects in 
Ramallah. Alcohol is allowed in Christianity and is served in the restaurants of 
Ramallah and can be purchased in its stores. This is not the case in Albiereh. 
The fact that the Christian population became a minority did not change the 
realm of the city,42 did not change the continuing freedom to drink alcohol 
in the city’s restaurants, hotels and bars. We should not ignore the fact that 
Ramallah hosts the premises of the PA, which is an authority that still keeps 
space with the Salafi Islamic stream. It makes an effort to differentiate itself 
from Hamas and still upholds to the incentive of “secularism” that dominated 
the PLO institutions in 1970s and 1980s. The demographic composition of the 
city, which is fee of family and clan influence, also raised its respect of religious 
and attitude pluralism. It is almost certain that if Hamas controlled the West 
Bank and Ramallah, it would endeavor to impose its cultural and social hege-
mony on the place, similar to the case of the Gaza Strip.
9. Ramallah and The Cultural Field
The recent events in Ramallah do not stem from vacuum. They resulted from the 
loss of political weight by the Palestinian political movement. An interviewee I 
talked to about the situation in Ramallah said that and I see it is an accurate opin-
ion. The same applies to the opinion supporting that the internal happenings of 
Ramallah intensively abridges the impact of neoliberal policies. Another opinion 
said that a new identity is now present in Ramallah, namely the “employee”, gen-
erated by the increasing role of businesspersons in Ramalalh-Albiereh-Betonia 
region. We can add to this that it resulted from the transformation of the Palestin-
42 On the status of Christians of Ramallah and the Territory occupied in 1967, see: Alshayeb, Yousef: “Christians of 
Ramallah, from landlords to decreased numbers”, Alsafeer Newspaper, Palestine Annex, issue 37 (fourth year, 
May 15th, 2013). Dr. Hana Issa, Secretary General of the Islamic-Christian Commission for the Safeguard of Holy 
Sites reports, based on the said reportage, that the number of Christians in the land occupied in 1967 used to 
be 2000, being 2% of the total population. Today, it decreased to merely 1%. He also says, based on the same 
report, that the number of Christians decreased noticeably since the Nakba of 1948. They used to represent 8% 
of the total population but today Palestinian Christians comprise 46,000 in the area occupied in 1967 and about 
110,000 in the area occupied in 1948. He mentioned that the number of Christians in Jerusalem decreased from 
27,000 in 1947 to about 5,000 today (2013). In Ramallah and its villages, the number of Christians does not 
exceed 10,000 (2013). In the US alone, there are about 50,000 Christians from Ramallah. Dr. Hana Issa blamed 
the occupation mainly for the immigration of Christians. He explained that according to the same report, the 
occupation controls the areas with holy sites and controls access thereto. He also mentioned that there were 
external forces concerned with evacuating Palestine of its Christian population to make the conflict in our coun-
try, especially in Jerusalem, appear as a conflict between Jews and Muslims and that it has nothing to do with 
the Christians. This is very serious and we must be aware of that at Palestinian and Arab levels. It is necessary to 
endeavor to consolidate Christians resilience and ensure they increase in numbers.”
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ian political movement from a national liberation project to a project of a state 
enclaved by a settler colonizing state. This project of the state transformed, pre-
maturely, the militants into staff of hierarchical institutions. The same applies to 
PA institutions in Ramallah and in Gaza.
Adopting neoliberal policies means implementing the free market economy as a 
priority in societal regulation. The society shrinks to mere consumers in a market 
that provides to the well off (a person with wealth and high income) everything 
he/she wants. As such was born a phenomenon of showoff consumption. Many 
said that the wealthy are no longer ashamed of living extravagantly, the shame of 
the first Intifada and till shortly after the second Intifada disappeared. The young 
generation does not resemble the senior ones. A young man said, “the new gener-
ation adopted a western lifestyle with high ceilings of freedoms among the young 
men and women of the “cream of the society”. Gender mixing is much easier than 
before” . Two other young men noted that banks and corporations’ employees ad-
opted a rather non-political religious lifestyle after years of living “irresponsibly”. 
Noticeable also the emergence of a culture that celebrates individualism and ef-
fluent consumerism, promoted by local, Arab and foreign satellite channels and 
on the Internet and social media. A female interviewee said, “the revolution of 
space channels introduced every pattern of life, starting with BNC to “fatafeet” (a 
food network channel working 24 hours). There are efforts to imitate these con-
sumer’s styles. People are now ready to be trapped in bank loans for this.” (. An-
other interviewee, speaking of the widespread of bank loans and mortgages said, 
“the country (PA areas in WBGS) are owned by banks”. (Annex 3, interview 18). 
Another confirmed saying,” Ramallah is now pawned to the banks” .
Several interviewees said Ramallah offered “a culture of elites and foreigners (Mah-
moud Darwish Museum, political debates, art performances, films and dance fes-
tivals). However, the large majority of people prefer the gym (fitness clubs) and 
swimming, which are available for 150 NIS a month. These are even available in 
Alamaari Camp. People prefer the café and “weight loss” programs and facial care. 
The dominant tool is the Facebook and TV lost its place as a family activity.” A fe-
male researcher said, “Rawabi represent intensive capital and Birzeit University is 
the cultural capital; they are both the product of a crisis…
The Palestinian cultural field – in Ramallah and the Palestinian Territory occupied 
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in 1967 and probably even the area occupied in 1948 as well – lives in a space that 
affects its track. There is first the settler colonial state (literature is abundant on the 
impacts of the control exercised by this state). Second, there is the PA and third 
the globalization with unlimited capital expansion under neoliberalism. The func-
tion of the state (the central political authority) is mainly to protect private capital. 
Fourth, there is the financial, real estate and trade capital who cares less about the 
values of modernity, liberty and equality. The PA does not allocate any resources 
to the cultural field as an independent area. NGOs cultural interests are limited to 
sponsoring activities that fall within their ideological agendas.
A writer sees that “the private sector does not distinguish between culture, pro-
paganda and advertisement.” Consequently, “the cultural field has turned into 
an area of trade”. “The PA is partner in transforming the cultural domain into a 
commercial field,,, (Annex 3, interview 24). He also sees that the cultural field, as 
it is embodied in Palestine, generates financial and symbolic capital to the non-
talented without any risk. It does not expose practitioners to imprisonment (loss 
of freedom) and generates symbolic capital under the motto of dealing with hu-
man and women rights and empowerment”. A young artist confirms “the cultural 
movement is currently keenly competing over limited sources of funding. It con-
sequently suffers from severe individualist sensitivities and fractions. In the past, 
there was an inclusive cultural institution (when the PLO was active). Now, we do 
not have any all-in institution. The conflict is individualized. What is happening is 
a “Gulfination” of the world; not citizenship. The citizens of Gulf countries consti-
tute only 10% while the remaining population work with a work license. The state 
bears no responsibility toward them. When they turn sixty years, they are ousted 
from the labor market and the society. There is new generation of workers who 
work as freelancers.” 
Some said that Palestinian capitalists donate to build a faculty or facility in Birzeit 
University so that the building bears their names43, but most of them are not 
willing to fund the educational cost of a university student). In other words, the 
cultural world lacks autonomous resources to ensure its sustainability and inde-
pendence. Some Palestinian (and Arab) capitalists try to gear part of their finan-
cial and commercial capital toward political capital (Muneib Almasri) or cultural 
capital (Welfare Institution and Hashem Alshawa) or cultural or symbolic capital 
43 The names include Mohammad Almasrouji, Saeed Khoury, Muneib Almasri, Najad Zaani, Aziz Shehada, Omar 
Alaqad as well as the Kingdom of Bahrain.
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(Qattan). Alkarmel magazine, where Mahmoud Darwish was the chief editor (with 
his cultural capital) was partly funded by Palestinian major capitalists.44 The Pales-
tinian Museum45, currently under construction near Birzeit University, is a major 
project of the Welfare Association.46 Some fund educational cultural centers like 
Qattan Center in Ramallah. Banks and companies (like Jawwal and others) fund 
artistic and cultural festivals. Some cultural (non school) centers are sponsored 
by international agencies (like the French-German Cultural Center), Ramallah Cul-
tural Palace, which was built mainly through Japanese funding.
A final remark in this context is: the financial, real estate and commercial capital 
seeks quick profit, was witnessed by many indicators in the city. It stripped many 
areas of their historical and aesthetic value to establish profit-making projects. 
An example to this are the multi-floor office buildings erected in the place of an 
old house and Albardouni restaurant in Yaffa St. There is also the renovation of 
Almuqtaah in a manner that altered its old features that had historial and political 
significance, including the besieging of Yasser Arafat and the demolition of most 
of its buildings during the land incursion of Ramallah by the Israeli army in 2002. 
Examples also include Uncle Sam restaurant that was turned into a bus depot. 
Note must be taken of the multiplicity of patterns of building and the decrease of 
green and planted areas not to mention the demolition of archaeological build-
44 It is not strange that capital leaves room for ideological freedom since it relies mainly on the balance of social 
powers so long as this does not hinder the growth of capital or undermine its social, political and ideological 
weight. (this is very well said with the motto “this was the gift of Allah”.)
45 I was told that the cost of the first phases of the museum reached $ 70 million. An interviewee told me that the 
museum was not discussed at societal level and that it does not represent a priority considering other more 
urgent needs of the Palestinian people. The Welfare Association defines the museum as “a free forum of dialogue 
that contributes to initiating a new discourse to communicate, learn and hope; it is a platform that embraces the 
creative work of scholars, researchers, artists in Palestine and the diaspora. It will open in 2016 with the purpose 
of “preserving the human memory of the Palestinian people.” The leaflet insisted on presenting the museum as 
an architectural landmark with “modern and contemporary style”. It is eager to become a model to be followed 
in “environmental sustainability around Palestine by its commitment to international green building standards”. 
It does not specify whether Palestine is historic Palestine or the Palestine defined by Oslo since the name of 
Israel does not appear in the definition and goals of the museum. It also does not include the goals of liberation, 
emancipation and struggle for the right of self-determination and return and combatting apartheid and ethnic 
cleansing. The language is chosen to assure visitors that they are before a modernist landmark with the latest 
environmental, visual aspects. It is the opposite image of the camp and the reality surrounded with poverty, 
unemployment, settlements, bypass roads, checkpoints, suffocating siege, home demolitions, arbitrary arrest 
on daily basis. It is a language deeply rooted in the lexicon of modernity, globalization and the capital that is 
confident to control it all about the Palestinian historical narrative. It is true that it mentions the Nakba but it also 
states that members of the Board of Trustees of the Welfare Association initiated the idea of the museum in 1998 
to commemorate the fifty years of the Nakba. It starts with an entry point that the Nakba is a historical event that 
must be documented and does not consider it as an ongoing act since 1948 to date.
46 The Welfare Association presents itself as a “not-for profit civil society foundation that aims to provide develop-
mental and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip and in 
the areas of 1948 and to the Palestinian communities in Lebanon.” It is funded by Palestinian capitalists.
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ings to build more ,multistory buildings where glass replaced stone (although 
more expensive) to duplicate the model of the Gulf states and Amman .
Ramallah is overcrowded with multistory buildings (some with over ten floors like 
Palestine commercial tower)47, built inside the city and within its periphery. Hous-
ing compounds also sprawled including Alriehan48 and Alghader, and cities like 
Rawabi49.
An engineer says, “in recent years, there were many unrented or unsold apart-
ments. Their percentage varies according to different estimates. He gives two ex-
planations for this, “first, they are used for money laundry and the second, the 
target of this urban sprawl is the employees and this target is already fulfilled 
leaving this surplus of unrented or unsold flats. The motivation behind continu-
ing investment in construction is that deposits at banks do not generate tangible 
interest rates making investment in real state a secured profit. The other areas of 
investment area almost nil. Women in Shaqba village sell their gold to invest in 
real estate,,,” (Annex 3, interview 22). Another adds, “the demand on real estate by 
international and nongovernmental organizations increased the price of the land. 
It motivated investment into real estate since banks do not pay enough interest 
on deposits. (Annex 3, interview 1). The dominant composition of the Palestinian 
capital is mainly in commerce, services and contracting. 
There aren’t accurate data on the size and sources of capital invested in Ramallah 
and its vicinities. This requires extensive review. We can conclude the following:
I. There is expatriate capital; a number of expatriates who invest part of their 
funds in their native land (building one or more apartment building) for “na-
47 The building has stores, restaurants, cinemas, a hotel and shops. It is reported to have cost $ 24 million. Its owner 
is from Abu Shkhiedem and his sons manage the property.
48 Alayyam Newspaper reported in its first page on June 24th 2015 a piece of news under the title of “Ammar for 
Real Estate Development” inaugurates the mosque of Alreihan with funding from the Arab Islamic Bank.” The 
chair of the Investment Fund, Dr. Mohammad Mustapha, said on the inauguration ceremony that ‘the opening 
of the Riehan Mosque complements the preparation of public facilities and utilities for the residents of Alriehan.’ 
He also mentioned that complementarity was taken into account in the building of the mosque to enable it pro-
vide educational and social services needed for any housing project.” Mustapha said, “We, with this opening in 
the Holy Month of Ramadan, have accomplished an important phase in the construction of public utilities in the 
neighborhood. The building of the Arab Consultancy Hospital is in its final stages and it should be handed over 
in summer 2015. The foundation stone was laid for the American School of AlRiehan, to become the academic 
monument to serve the Rihand and neighboring areas residents. The investment reached $ 28 million.
49 The advertisement used to promote Rawabi appears on the streets of Ramallah with the slogan “most beautiful 
apartment in the most beautiful neighborhood”, “multiple choices for payment on instalments”, “key delivery as 
of today”, Palestine Real Estate Development Company also figures ads to sell office spaces on instalments. 
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tionalistic” motives. Others build for “money laundering” since part of the as-
sets invested are not officially registered in the USA and they therefore transfer 
these funds abroad in the form of real estate property. As such, they evade tax-
es payable to the state since disclosing any such assets (after September 11th, 
2001) may raise suspicions about relation with “terrorism”. Others claim that 
money laundering is not limited to investments by expatriates but includes 
as well Palestinians from inside the Green Line and others from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, although at smaller scale.
II. Holding Companies Capital, including PADICO and PRECO among others in ad-
dition to the Palestine Investment Fund. They invest in housing and buildings 
for other purposes as is the case of Rawabi, Riehan, and Reef. Some claimed 
those were funds from the Gulf States (naming Qatar and UAE), investing in 
Ramallah. This influenced the concept of housing and architectural language .
III. Local Capital, part of which is registered under their owners’ names (Alnabali, 
Alfares, Albakri). This capital is interested in real estate for three reasons: this 
investment does not require practical experience or specific knowledge (as is 
the case for telecommunication); second, it is risk-free investment with guar-
anteed profits; third, it does not require a high level of social responsibility and 
transparency. Some underscored that the local capital is individualist, being 
partly a returnee expatriate, and mostly individuals who worked as contrac-
tors in Israel and then moved to the West Bank after the Second Intifada. Work 
inside Israel decreased and building opportunities in the West Bank in general 
and Ramallah in particular appeared.
Local capital investments generate high profit since they employ family mem-
bers (including children and women) and opts for informal economy (unpro-
tected labor). Some invest (in real estate and commerce) without having re-
course to banks to avoid disclosing their profits and thus evade taxes. Some 
even provide loans to their clients purchasing housing units or offices (see An-
nex 4). In the past, some of these investors worked in money exchange and 
were transformed in pseudo banks to invest in real estate and trade until the 
PA intervened in the past decade (in the aftermath of the Second Intifada) and 
regulated money exchange.
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A final word: 
Ramallah, as described my Mahmoud Darwish, is “a city that grows hastily”. This is 
not the worrying aspect,  but rather that it is growing without a compass and with 
some self-admiration. It does not observe the wisdom of its national message or 
of its composition. The city admiringly presents itself (via PA, private sector and 
civil society organization) as an open, pluralist, modern, and life-loving city. But, it 
created itself as a middle class city with multiple roots, cultures and experiences. 
As a class (like its counterparts in most Arab societies), this middle class is ob-
sessed with consumption and is far from being productive. Its new and old well 
offs exhibit their wealth without any shame. They chant unmonitored profits and 
fortune without any social responsibility. 
In the shadow of the colonial state, the city is fully geared by financial and real 
estate capital (including banks, real estate developers, private capitals) who are 
pulling the city outside the Palestinian time and place. They act in a manner that 
ignores the measures of the settler colonial state and the apartheid regime it im-
poses. They recall the Nakba like a historical expired event and not as an ongoing 
act. They – under the pretext of being realistic – jump over the historical rights 
of the Palestinian people. They do not care for the increasing gap of wealth with 
extreme wealth and dire poverty. They only view this gap as a reason for some 
benevolent act.
My fear is that the celebration of Ramallah as the miracle city will turn into a ritual 
that deviates our attention of the savagery circulating us; it will take us far from re-
alizing that this miracle requires – among other things – freedom making, equal-
ity management, justice and installment of the tenets of national and humane 
dignity. 
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Annex 1
Interviews (without titles) with all respect due
(in Alphabetical order)
1. Jawad Ibrahim (plastic artist)
2. Hazem Abu Hilal (youth, human rights and social activist)
3. Ayshah Ahmad (Researcher in human rights, Independent Commission for 
Human Rights)
4. Sam Bahour (business consultant)
5. Khaldoun Bisharah (Director of the Riwaq – Center for Architectural Conserva-
tion)
6. Alaa Altartir (Program Office, Palestinian Policies Network “Alshabakah”, aca-
demic researcher
7. Marwan Alju’bah (owner of Alju’bah bookshop Rukab Street)
8. Areej Hijazi (Activist in cultural administration)
9. Iyad Haddad (human rights activist and researcher)
10. Isa and Nakhla Alussari (owners of shop for sale and repair of computers – Ra-
mallah Altahta
11. Mohannad Abdlehamid (writer, political analyst)
12. Muhammad Hamarshe (Architecture)
13. Hassan Khader (writer, political and cultural analyst)
14. Salma Alkhalidi (Expert in education)
15. Saadah Alkhateeb (former employee at the Ministry of Information, professor 
at Alquds Open University)
16. Yazan Alkhalil (artist and youth activist)
17. Marshoud Zayed (employee at the Palestine Studies Institute, accountant at 
Darna Restaurant)
18. Mahmoud Ziyadah (syndical activist)
19. Jamal Zaqout (Director of Ard Studies Center, Ramallah)
20. Zeyd Alshuaibi (political youth activist, Ramallah – Albiereh)
21. Ruba Saleh (Researcher on urban zones and conflicts therein)
22. Yazeed Anani (Professor at Faculty of Engineering, Birzeit University)
23. Hada Alaryan (lecturer at Faculty of Commerce, employee at the Palestinian 
Institute for Democracy studies – Muwatin)
24. Huneideh Ghanem (Director of the Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies – Madar)
25. Muhammad Masharqeh (lived for years in Ramallah and contributed to the 
organization of the Ramallah Cultural Festival)
26. Janet Michael (Former mayor of Ramallah)
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27. Majdi Almalki (Professor of sociology, Birzeit University
28. Misyef Misyef (senior researcher, Palestinian Economic Policy Research Insti-
tute – MAS)
29. Adnan Almasri (Employee at Masarat)
30. Hani Almasri, political analyst (Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy Re-
search and Strategic Studies – MASARAT)
2. Interviews organized by the Center for Development Studies (Birzeit Uni-
versity). 
1. Ahmad Abu Laban (Director of Ramallah Municipality
2. Bilal Jaber (Administrative Director of Ribhi Alhajjah Company)
3. Dima Joudeh (Acting Assistant to the Municipality of Albiereh for technical 
affairs “engineering and planning”)
4. Mousa Hadid (Mayor of Ramallah)
5. Ahmed Alkhateeb (Director General of Public Affairs, Governorate of Ramallah 
and Albiereh)
6. Issa Salameh (Secretary of Parish Council of Roman Catholic sect)
7. Ahmad Nasser (Financial Officer, Nabali and Faris for Real Estate Investment)
8. Three staff members in Ramallah Municipality
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Annex 2
Ramallah in figures
Data of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics show that:
Workers in professions from the middle class (with cultural-academic capital of 
different levels and forms50). In Ramallah, the total number of workers in the city 
was 59.9%, in Albiereh 55.7%, and in Betonia 45.1%. the percentage of skilled and 
unskilled labor in the same year reached 8.7% of the total number of workers in 
Ramallah, representing 11.9% in Albiereh, 17.1% in Betonia. Workers in services, 
shop attendants and sellers in markets represented in the same year 20.5% of 
the active population of Ramallah, 18.7% in Albiereh and 19.1% in Betonia. Hand-
crafters represented the highest percentage with 18.9% of the active population, 
13.6% in Albiereh and 10.9% in Ramallah (General Census on Population and 
housing, 2007).
The expansion of the middle class appears in Ramallah-Betonia community, if 
compared to the size of the middle class in the rest of the West Bank. They rep-
resented 27.1% in June 2012 (Table 27 on the Survey of Labor Force, PCBS, June 
2012). This means half its level in Ramallah-Albiereh-Betonia. In the West Bank, 
the middle class barely constitute 8% of the West Bank in 1961.51 The Middle class 
represented 10 – 12 % of the total population in the West Bank in 1980s till 1993 
(prior to the PA advent), and increased to 20% of total workers in the West Bank 
in 1997.52
PCBS data (Census on population and housing for the years 1997 and 2007) n 
Ramallah-Albiereh-Betonia showed tremendous transformations in this period 
between the two censes in the professional composition of the three urban cen-
ters. Workers in middle class professions increased noticeable in all three zones 
between 1997-2—7, rising from 46.8% to 59.9% in Ramallah (an increase of over 
13%) and from 46.0% to 55.7% in Albiereh (a rise of over 9.5%) and from 32.8% to 
50 These professions included in 2007, as per the Housing and Population General Census, what follows: legislators 
and senior management (in Ramallah they represented 12.2% of staff, in Albiereh 11.0% and in Betonia 6.6%), 
and specialized professionals (representing 27.4% in Ramalah, 24.8% in Albiereh and 19.2% in Betonia). They 
also include assistants to technicians (constituting in Ramallah 12.3% and in Albiereh 12.8% and in Betonia 
12.6%), and clerks (representing 8.0% in Ramallah and 7.1% in Albiereh and 6.7% in Betonia).
51 Hilal, J., The Palestinian Middle Class, Muwaten, the Palestinian Institute for Democratic Stuides, Palestine Stud-
ies Institute, Ramallah and Beirut, 2006, p. 55
52 Ibid, p. 58
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45.1% (an increase of over 12%). On the other hand, the percentage of workers in 
middle class professions in Jerusalem (mostly urban area with agricultural labor 
representing less than 1%), constitute 25.7% of the governorate’s active popu-
lation. The percentage of other labor segments represented 49% with 25.3% of 
handcrafters.53
The relatively large expansion of the middle class (with its different segments) 
was in the city of Ramallah. We need here to differentiate between the term used 
by Marx “small Bourgeoisie” (holders of small capital including small famers, shop 
owners, small workshop owners and handcrafters who own their tools and are 
self-employed) and the middle class that appeared mainly with the modern state 
and its subsequent public and private educational establishments, publishing 
houses, capitalist market economy and emergence of civil society organizations 
(political parties, unions, syndicates, human rights and charitable societies). The 
middle class comprises holders of cultural capital (educated figures, specialized 
professionals like doctors, engineers, teachers, nurses, scholars, artists, education-
alists and administrators). It is important to differentiate both classes because of 
the difference in work terms and circumstances (in terms of pay, working hours, 
work conditions, paid leaves and insurances), without ignoring the disparity 
among the segments of each class. This appears if we monitor holders of interme-
diate diplomas, which is higher among technicians, specialists and their assistants, 
and clerks”. This is the bulk subclass of the middle class, and represented in 2012 
60.1% of the West Bank while the rate of service workers and merchants stood at 
7.7% and handcrafters constituted 4% and primary professions 3.4% while skilled 
labors constituted 5.2% and instrument operators 3.4%.54
The largest increase of the components of the middle class in the three locations 
(Ramallah-Albiereh-Betonia) in the period from 1994-2007 was in the segment of 
specialized professions, technicians and their assistants. It increased from 28.1% 
to 39.7% in Ramallah, and from 28.2% to 37.6% in Albiereh and from 20.5% to 
31.8% in Betonia. This is attributable to the overstaffing of the public sector and 
increased recruitment in the modern private sector. The upper middle class pre-
served its levels (of the total active population) marking a meager increase in the 
three locations with the highest increase in Ramallah wehre it rose from 10.2% in 
53 Palestinian National Authority, PCBS, Final Results of Census 2007, Ramallah-Albiereh Governorate, Ramallah, 
June 2009
54 See: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015. Labour Force Survey: (October December, 2014) Round, 
(Q4/2014). Press Report on the Labour Force Survey Results. Ramallah – Palestine (table, 28).
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1997 to 12.2% in 2007, in Albiereh from 9.9% to 11.0% and in Betonia from 6.3% to 
6.6%. the middle class with the lowest share preserved its relative size in all three 
locations (ranging from 6.5% to 8.0% of the total active population in 2007).
The increase in the size of the middle class in Ramallah-Aliereh and Betonia affect-
ed the numerical and relative sizes. Numerically the upper and middle subclasses 
increased in Ramallah from 1399 in 1997 to 2871 in 2007, in Albiereh from 1722 
to 3598 for the same year. In Betonia it doubled from 451 to 1164. In total, the size 
of the middle subclass in Ramallah-Albeireh-Betonia increased from 3572 persons 
in 1997 to 7633 persons in 2007. It is expected to have exceed 12,000 in 2015. If 
we add to this lowest subclass of the middle class, the population of the middle 
class in 2007 in all three (neighboring, even overlapping) locations reached 11688 
persons. This means their size in 2015 would not be less than 20,000. This is signifi-
cant if compared to the total population of all three locations. This figure does not 
include foreign employees in international organizations, embassies and NGOs. 
It does not include foreign visitors to governmental and nongovernmental or-
ganizations either. Probably this explains the relatively constant widespread of 
restaurants and coffee shops in Ramallah, and is a key engine in its urban sprawl.
Data on population and housing for the year 2007 so that most female workers 
in Ramallah-Albiereh-Betonia region belong to the middle class (with its different 
subclasses). They represented 88% of all working women in the city of Ramallah 
and 86% of working women in Albiereh and 81% in Betonia. Women participation 
in labor in all of these locations is noticeably the highest across the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. This is probably attributable to the availability of more job op-
portunities for women in the public sector (mainly in the sectors of education and 
health) and to the type of activities of the private sector (as this region is the seat 
of many private sector companies) in addition to the number of NGOs headquar-
tered therein. Women constituted 27.2% of the labor force in Albiereh and 44.7% 
in Ramallah and 28.8% in Betonia. The largest segment of working women be-
long to the middle subclass (in terms of conditions and status of work) since they 
are mostly concentrated in the middle management of the public sector and the 
lower hierarchy of the new private sector (banks, telecommunication, insurance). 
The middle subclass represented 60% of working women in each of the three 
locations in 2007. However, the share of women in low hierarchy jobs (secretary 
in the public and private sector) is twice as much the overall average (male and 
female) in all three locations (ranging between 15 – 16%).
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1. Key Words:
 Gentrification: social spatial replacement « the gentrification of poor neighbor-
hoods », social and colonialist engineering, random expansion, urban expansion 
and social / spatial surveillance strategies. 
The study aims to examine the urban changes in the Palestinian urban structures 
and their effect on the emergence of new residential communities and creation 
of new socioeconomic classes.
 
2. Summary: 
The study reviews the changes affecting the Palestinian urban realm with the 
emergence of new cities and neighborhoods by analyzing the socioeconomic 
policies applied to housing. It further examines the promulgation of laws, issu-
ance of building licenses/random construction and their relation to the Palestin-
ian Authority urban planning and the effect of colonization policies on the draw-
ing of social spaces and the zoning of the colonial social engineering of the areas 
of Palestinian settlers. It also aims to understand the influence of these transfor-
mations on different communities: enlargement of the communities, change of 
their characteristics including appearance of segments or categories who replace 
other segments. It investigates the move of demographic groups into new urban 
areas and the socioeconomic exclusion of some cities in detriment of other cities 
or the gentrification, socio-spatial replacement “gentrification of poor neighbor-
hoods.”.
3. Theoretical Approach:
The approach to the afore-stated cases is two-folds: the first approach is the ne-
cessity to examine the mechanisms that led to the formation of urban zones and 
their history, and to understand the socioeconomic changes in these communi-
ties. It also examines the impact of gentrification on subsequent creation of new 
51
social segments that reshape the space. The second approach focuses on gentri-
fication, i.e. socio-spatial replacement with the gentrification of poor neighbor-
hoods. These areas attracted attention in the 1970’s in the Anglo-Saxon domain1 
that focused on urban planning of city centers and its subsequent exclusion of 
poor segments to serve middle or upper-middle clashes. We will apply the first 
approach.
Under the successive colonial context, the Palestinian society underwent several 
urban changes that stemmed from socioeconomic policies, which did not respond 
to the demographic needs emerging from rapid urbanization of Palestinian urban 
centers. With the accelerated growth of new areas and increased youth segment, 
which adopted a new consumerist lifestyles - because of the policies dominated 
by privatization and unsustainable real estate policy- and with numerous social 
challenges – mainly urban challenges and plural socio-urban disparities, urban 
sprawl and unregulated expansion of quasi-urban centers and appearance of 
squatter areas -, the spatial area of Ramallah increased. These centers appeared in 
detriment of other urban zones, including models like Ramallah and Gaza, mak-
ing them zones of attraction and expulsion whose inhabitants migrate toward the 
cities. Consequently, conscious and subconscious policies of total socioeconomic, 
cultural structural exclusion are applied leading to disparities and urban defla-
tion. We witness than an Ammanization (Amman-Jordan), i.e. “City-state” or the 
emergence of suburbs and urban crawling. 
 
This study examines some urban problems to understand the changes that af-
fected the social relations in social spaces. It aims to understand the nature of 
local changes and their relation to “national” changes. It also reviews the role of 
public sectors in the process whether they disregarded the growth of private sec-
tor investments in these neighborhoods through the “urban sprawl” or the policy 
harmonization with the globalized neoliberal policies to occupied the socio-
geographic space. The Palestinian case lacks public housing policies save limited 
PA intervention. Consequently, the question of geographic gentrification is less 
appropriate to study the Palestinian urban realm. Indeed, there have not been 
1  GLASS, R., 1964, « Introduction », in Centre for Urban Studies (dir.), London, aspects of change, Londres, Macgib-
bon & Kee, p. XII-XLI ; SMITH, N., 1979, « Gentrification and capital : practice and ideology in Society Hill », Anti-
pode, vol. 11, no 3, p. 24-35 ; SMITH, N., 1982, « Gentrification and uneven development », Economic Geography, 
vol. 58, no 2, p. 139-155 ; SMITH, N., 1992, « New city, new frontier : the Lower East Side as wild, wild West », in 
Sorkin, M. (dir.), Variations on a theme park : the new American city and the end of public space, New York, Hill 
and Wang, p. 61-93; 
SMITH, N., 1996, The New urban frontier: gentrification and the revanchist city, New York, Routledge, XX-262.
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wide replacement of the original residents by new comers, not in Kufur Aqab or 
in Ramallah Althat or in the Qasaba Neighborhood of Nablus. There has not been 
demolition of old properties nor renovation of old buildings for investment pur-
poses. Such processes were quite narrow in reason of absence of any state inter-
vention therein. There was no “city cleansing” as was the case in other parts of the 
world. Nor has there been intensive or rather organized demolition of buildings. 
However, new suburbs emerged creating new social segments and consumption 
patterns and life-styles. The surging of new neighborhoods – like Kufur Aqab -, 
which have been attracting new dwellers due to colonial planning and “legal in-
struments” drafted to force a large portion of the population into these zones. 
Therefore, the study focuses on Kufur Aqab as a case study to examine the ap-
proaches based on a field study and examination of the living situation. 
4. Methodology
Two researchers from Birzeit University, Yasmeen Qaadan and Sarah Zahran, 
conducted the interviews. They held twenty in-depth interview with many re-
spondents. The interviews were difficult because of the suspicion and fear that 
respondents living in Kufur Aqab feel. A representative sample of different social 
segments was selected to include contractors, local councils’ members, civil soci-
ety organizations, activists, politicians, citizens and merchants. 
5. Kufur Aqab, Socio-historical Background
Kufur Aqab is a village is part of the Jerusalem Governorate, situated to the north 
of Jerusalem. It borders Rafat to the East and Albiereh to the north; as for the 
west, it shares boundaries with Rafat and Qalandia and Ram, Qalandia and Qa-
landia Camp to the south. Kurful Aqab Village Council was established in 1996. It 
bears this name after a person called “Kafeer” who passed by the town in the Otto-
man Era and stayed near its will. The term Aqab came from the Arabic word “Aqib”, 
which means who stayed in the area. The term then mutated to read “Kufur Aqab. 
The town is home of many antiquities in the old town. It has a number of health 
centers and schools. Its economy relies heavily on the Israeli labor market, which 
employs 50^ of its labor force. The other labor force works in agriculture, services, 
industry, government, and private sectors2.
2  - ARIJ, Jerusalem, Kufur Aqab Guide, Jerusalem 2012, p 1-7
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Kufur Aqab lacks public services, especially hygiene. Its streets are loaded with 
rubbish and they are not paved. The place is full of dust, an consequently health 
hazards. Additionally, inhabitants face many problems getting fixed phone line 
subscription with [the Israeli]“Biezek” Company, which does not care for this zone. 
Residents are also denied access to the Palestinian Telecommunication Company 
services.3 
As for the geopolitical characteristics of Kufur Aqab, it covers an area of 6.665 
dunums. It is under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Jerusalem because of 
its location. According to the Oslo Agreements that divided the West Bank Terri-
tory in Areas (A-B-C), Kufur Aqab was not part of this division. It kept its pre-Oslo 
status-quo and remained within the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Jerusalem. 
Thousands of its donums were confiscated by the Israeli authorities to build set-
tlements. Thirty percent of the village land was expropriated for Kukhav Yakov 
– Abeer Yakov” Settlement. Israeli plans still threaten the village of further seizure 
of land and demolition of houses to expand the settlement built on its land.4  On 
top of the confiscation of land, the Apartheid Wall, built by Israel in the Second 
Intifada, isolated Kufur Aqab ad Shufat Refugee Camp, creating two exceptional 
cases within the Jerusalem boundary since both areas remained within the mu-
nicipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem5. 
6. Literature Review
We refer here to a number of studies that addressed the question of Kufur Aqab 
in recent years. Khamaysi presents a monitoring and analysis in his study of the 
status of urban transformation in Jerusalem. He thinks it began in 1991 with the 
restrictions imposed on entrance of Palestinians from the West Bank thereto. These 
controls intensified in 1993 with the erection of military checkpoints around Jeru-
salem. Consequently, Jerusalem became a closed zone, which hindered the urban 
development of the city. In particular, it complied with the demographic, planning 
and geographic policies of the so-called Municipality of Jerusalem and the “Israeli” 
government. They both deployed effort to halt an urban expansion of Jerusalem 
and devised plans to create disconnected enclaves. Consequently, it could not be 
transformed into a major Palestinian urban center that attracts municipal or na-
3 Abu Ghanam, M., Kufur Aqab, Occupation Municipality opens for tax collection and closes for services, on http://
www.alhayat.ps
4 ARIJ, IDEM, p 6-17.
5 Ahmed, Jerusalem and hte Apartheid Wall, Alzaytona Center for Studies and Consultancies on http://www.alzay-
touna.net/Rimawi
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tional events and functions6. This included the urban distortion of the Jerusalem 
area since it was not matched with functional making or alteration. The urban pro-
cess did not lead to a state of urbanism since the villages merged into the urban 
expansion and contributed to its formation. The absence of an urbanism process 
alongside the urbanization, and the absence of the “Israeli” municipal and national 
institutions that guide the execution of these processes and provide them with the 
necessary infrastructure to establish for the physical urbanism, which – in provid-
ing housing – depends mainly on self-initiatives available on the land. Most of the 
public lands are under Israeli control and the state [Israel] allocated them to build 
Israeli settlements and green no-building zones to inhibit any Palestinian Arab ur-
ban contiguity.7
Khamaysi adds that the remaining areas where it is allowed for the Palestinians to 
build do not exceed 13%, noting also their soaring prices. It is moreover difficult 
to obtain a building license from the Israeli authorities8.  The housing area avail-
able per person in the Jewish neighborhoods reaches 20 m2, compared to 11 m2 
in the Palestinian neighborhoods9. The closure of immigration into Jerusalem and 
the planting of Palestinian economic activity therein increased demand on hous-
ing in Al-Ram, Bier Nabala, Kufur Aqab and Ramallah and Albiereh. Kufur Aqab, 
situated on the boundary between Qualandia and Albiereh, became outside the 
Apartheid Wall but remained under the jurisdiction of Jerusalem Municipality. Al-
though it is still officially within the boundaries of Jerusalem, it became a target 
for investors to started building housing units and stores outside the border of 
Jerusalem and Ramallah, aligning with space offered by the Wall. The absence of 
any organized central or local government created a random unorganized urban 
morphology10. 
Kufur Aqab is administratively part of the municipality of the colonization in Oc-
cupied Jerusalem. It is part of the Jerusalemite neighborhoods ousted of Jerusa-
lem by the construction of the Apartheid Wall. In addition to the transformation I 
mentioned in the beginning, the establishment of the Apartheid Wall in 2003, this 
expansion rendered it a choice of residence by the Jerusalemites. Although it was 
6   Khamaysi, Rasem, Reshaping the Jerusalem Urban Periphery « Heart of the State », Hawliyat Magazine, Jeru-
salem, Issue 16, 2013, p. 41
7  Khamaysi, Rasem, Ibid, 41
8 UN-OCHA, East Jerusalem, Main Concerns about Humanitarian Situation, Special Report, March 2011, p.9
9 Uleyan, Nisreen, et. Al, Impact of Poverty Policies on East Jerusalem, traslated into Arabic, Citizens’ Rights As-
sociation in Israel, May 2012, p. 2
10 Khamaysi, Rasem, Iedm, 46-47
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taken out of the “Wall border of Jerusalem”, and became on the “West Bank Side of 
the Wall”, it is still part of the Municipality of Jerusalem. 
The colonial state “Israel” exploited security pretexts to erect the Apartheid Wall 
to enforce its policy of withdrawal of Jerusalem IDs from Palestinian Jerusalemites 
who could not provide evidence of residency and attachment to Jerusalem. With 
Kufur Aqab remaining within the municipal border of Jerusalem, many Jerusale-
mites opted to live there and paid the Arnona “property tax” to prove their attach-
ment to their Jerusalem IDs. In addition to its policy to deprive Palestinians of the 
Jerusalem ID, Israel prevents family reunification of Palestinians of the West Bank 
with their families in Jerusalem. These families are henceforth forced to migrate 
toward Kufur Aqab, on the West Bank side of the wall. However, it actually does 
not receive any services from the occupation municipality, save education11. As 
regards education and its relation to the municipality, Kufur Aqab has two schools 
under the authority of the Jerusalem Municipality and two others run by the Pal-
estinian Ministry of education in addition to four private schools12.
As for housing, the occupation municipality does not play its planning and super-
vision role to survey land. The land is miserable whether built-up or green areas. 
The municipality does not regulate the setbacks between buildings or their dis-
tance from the street. Consequently, chaos was created with crowded tall build-
ings whose windows overlook rooms in neighboring buildings. Inhabitants lost 
their privacy. Moreover, the quality of building is not guaranteed and depends on 
the conscience of the contractor. Ownership in this neighborhood is registered 
via revocation of title before a notary public. The title deeds are not officially reg-
istered and do not constitute a guarantee of ownership13.. 
 
The chaos of squatter areas, mentioned before, coincides with the spread of “il-
legal” buildings due to soaring rents in Jerusalem and shrinking area of land. On 
the other hand, it is difficult for the Palestinians to obtain a building license. The 
number of licenses issued per year does not fulfill housing needs. The Israeli orga-
nization “Eir Emem” says that the demographic growth of the Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem requires the construction of 1500 residential units per year. Still, only 
11 Palestinian Information Center, Kufur Aqab, Flagrant Example of Displacement of Jerusalemites, Report, Jerusa-
lem, October 2013
12 ARIJ, Kufur Aqab Guide, 2012, p. 8
13 Abu Ghannam, Maysa, Kufur Aqab, Occupation Muncipality Opens for Tax Collection and Closes for services, 
Alhayat Aljadeeda
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400 new housing units received licenses. This leaves inhabitant with a housing 
gap of 1000 units a year, being the difference between housing needs and legal 
building license. 32% of Palestnian houses in East Jerusalem were built in contra-
diction with Israeli zoning requirements.14. 
The Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory “OCHA” reports on the “illegal building” as follows: there are no reliable 
data on the spread of “illegal building” at the moment. Stories told by the people 
show a decrease in the past years of any “illegal” constructions in large parts of 
East Jerusalem because of the rigid application of laws by the Israeli authorizes. 
Still, unlicensed buildings are quite common on other parts like Kufur Aqab, weh-
re only minimal municipality services and supervision are available”.15 The vision 
in OCHA’s study suggests that “illegal” construction is a confrontation strategy 
adopted by the Palestinians to face the housing crisis in East Jerusalem16.  The 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has not conducted any census of hous-
ing and population in Kufur Aqab in 2007, however the Israel Central statistics.17 
reported a population of 14,315 persons in 2010. Civil society resources reported 
18 thousand, as stated by the head of the village council referring to the central 
statistics. Some speak of 70 thousand. This means that registration is a state affair 
in the Bourdisan meaning of term. It has to do with the monopoly of information 
capital, that is not available to the PA or to any other local authority. In addition to 
the “illegal” random housing and construction in Kufurr Aqab, the village suffers 
insufficient permits of another type. The Municipality hinders the village council 
access to permits to establish waste landfills. This leads to accumulation of waste 
between buildings in Kufur Aqab, posing hazard to inhabitants’ health18.
7. Colonial Discriminatory Practices
The socio-geographic space is par excellence under control and monitoring. It is, 
as seen by Lefebvre19, that the social space is a tool of thinking while simultaneous-
ly being an act and a means of production and monitoring. It is therefore a domain 
of hegemony and influence. The social space is not a mere undifferentiated pot 
or “neutral décor” of cumulative events taking place in the social life. It is rather a 
14 - UN-OCHA, Idem, 30-35 
15 - UN-OCHA, Idem, 36
16 - UN-OCHA, Idem, 36 
17 - ARIJ, Idem, 7
18 -ARIJ, Idem, 13
19 Lefebvre (H.), La Production de l’espace, Anthropos, Paris, pp. 88-89, 1974.
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product of the society where all social relations are constituted with their different 
economic, political and ideological dimensions. In the same manner, it is the place 
of the social production itself, as seen by Castells20. It is also know as a lively space 
of the discourse of the authority and hegemony, as described by Foucault who 
considers the typographic and architectural changes as forms of colonial activities 
for the dominated and a process that forms their spaces in a manner emphasizing 
the authority representations and tools of control. Geographically, according to 
Yves Lacoste, Geography is first fit to initiate a war.21. in the same context, Danielle 
Lochac22 thinks that control over the space includes monitoring of the population 
occupying this space and vice-versa. In other words, the process to control people 
does not necessarily require full control of the space. These double approaches 
explain the central role of the space in the social surveillance strategies. 
In our case study of a colonized society subjected to a colonial condition23, which 
– in our opinion – must be studied under what can be called the colonial phenom-
enon. We can refer to Marcel Mauss’s24 description of this colonial phenomenon 
as a “totalitarian one” in order to diagnose the Palestinian case. Since the nature of 
the colonial project to control the space and its occupants, we need to recall that 
this colonization per se, quite simply, means space domination in several forms 
including: control over large areas of the urban space in the cities regulated by 
the colonial power; promulgation of laws and regulations based on two core prin-
ciples, namely “ethnic” discrimination – which is linked to suppression-, and miti-
gation, which has functional expressions in cities, as described in a similar case 
in the Martinique by Aimé Césaire25. “ We saw the first French gendarme before 
we saw social welfare.” As was the case in former colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, see for instance studies on the role of colonization in the urban planning 
of Morocco inhabitants in the colonial era26, we notice that the “Israeli” practices 
have precedence in other “colonialist” models. In our opinion, Palestinian studies 
must usher into spaces of comparison to exit what we commonly call “the Pales-
20 CASTELLS (M.), Lo question urbaine, Maspero, 1972.
21 LACOSTE (Y.), La géographie, ça sert d›abord à faire la guerre, Petite Coll. Maspero,1976.
22 Lochak, (D.,) « Espace et Contrôle Sociale », dans chevalier J, centre Periphitia Territoira,CURAPP, paris, PUF , 
1979, p170.
23 BALANDIER (G.), “La situation coloniale. Approche théorique”. EXTRAITS. Un article publié dans les Cahiers inter-
nationaux de sociologie, vol. 110, janvier-juin 2001, pp. 9-29. Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France.
24 MAUSS (H.,) 1969, Œuvres, T. III : Cohésion sociale et divisions de la sociologie, Paris, Minuit. 1978 [1950], 
Sociologie et anthropologie, Paris, PUF.
25 
26 Naciri (M.,) Pouvoir de commandement, espace rural et modernisation au Maroc, in BATAILLON (C.) et autres, 
Etat, pouvoir et espace dans le Tiers Monde, P.U.F., Coll. IEDES, 1977.
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tinian specificity” to institute the necessity to recall other colonial experiences in 
the world. This will first localize the context and then open new horizons for stud-
ies about the Palestinian context, being a colonial context.
We may remember here what Fanon said about the differences between the 
zones of the colonizers and those of the colonized even with time-space differ-
ences. This comparison institutes for the understanding of the mechanisms that 
separate the zones of the colonizers and the colonized. Fanon says, “these two 
zones are contradictory and subject to mutual exclusion: there isn’t any possible 
conciliation since the city of the colonizers differs in the stone and iron … it is a 
city with paved roads and lights… their streets are clean and smooth without 
holds. It is the city of the lazy, and well-fed population … the city of the White 
foreigners. The city of the colonized is a negre village with unnatural space; it is 
full of men with bad reputation stacked in boxes one on top of the other. They 
die there … in the city of the starved, deprived of bread, meat, shoes, and coal. 
They live with minimum lights… the city of the colonized is designed to land on 
its knees…27.
The description of Fanon does not necessarily apply to the Palestinian urban for-
mations since the Palestinian economy – whether before Oslo or after the Paris 
Protocol – and its urban architectural byproducts produced forms similar to the 
colonialist cases described by Fanon in some camps and poor Palestinian sub-
urbs. However, it did not produce “modernist” colonial formations that reproduce 
the colonizers’ architecture and adopt their construction patterns and tools. We 
should recall here that the new suburbs built by the Palestinians, like the Palestin-
ian Diplomatic Quarter near Altiereh in Ramallah, have a visual appearance like 
an “Israeli” settlement, architecturally speaking. It also occupies an elevated space 
and applies the patterns of construction and inner spaces applied in these settle-
ments. This makes us believe that Fanon’s imaginary of the colonized passion for 
the colonizer and the attempt made by the colonized Palestinians to personify 
the colonizer by applying its architecture and consumption patterns28.  This is em-
phatic in the Palestinian colonial case and reproduces the colonialist domination 
in the form of new engineering forms in the spaces of the colonized. They appear 
like authoritarian engineered shapes and reproduce the colonial domination by 
reproducing the designs that help shriveling the colonized Palestinian space by 
27 Fanon Franz, oeuvres, la découvert, 2012.
28 Fanon, Frantz.  Peau noire, masques blancs. , Paris : Seuil, 1952.
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the Zionist colonizer in the streets, checkpoints and settlements and trough the 
settlement expansion of the colonizers themselves. 
8. Colonial social Architecture Planning Kufur Aqab
The Colonizing state has always endeavored to evacuate the city of its indigenous 
inhabitants to replace them with colonizers of different types. It used several pre-
texts to strip thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites of their “residency rights in 
Jerusalem”, through “Israeli planning” of the administrative borders of Jerusalem, 
which is c considered part of the “state of Israel”. Consequently, Palestinians re-
siding in Jerusalem suburbs lose their right of residency, as is the case of other 
Jerusalemites in the Palestinian governorates. Information on the confiscation of 
Jerusalem ID cards is mainly derived from what the “Israeli Interior Ministry” re-
ports. It reported confiscation of 14,233 ID cards in the period from 1967 to 2011, 
depending on the ID of the head of household. As such, the number of individuals 
affiliated to the family of the head of household who list their ID’s is much higher 
than this figure29. 
9. Investment Appeal Zone: Between Colonial Planning and No PA In-
tervention
Kufur Aqab is a rural area and has a village council but nothing connects the space 
to the Palestinian village. The colonial distortion juxtaposes over many Palestinian 
villages which have grown into shantytowns. In these areas, the village prescribes 
the culture, which is in disharmony with the physical/ geographic and typograph-
ic scene. The village is disfigured and preserve only “social conservatism” while its 
urban architecture becomes modern in terms of space and function. The Palestin-
ian village no longer produces crops or kettle save at very small scale. It adopted 
consumerist patterns consistent with the urban style. This concords with what 
Saleh Abdeljawwad and Sari Hanafi call “total socio-cide” or total destruction30. 
29 PCBS, Jerusalem Annual Statistics Book, Ramallah, issue 14, 2012, 203-204
30 For more details, see studies by Saleh AbdelJawwad and Sari Hanafi, where Abdeljawwad Saleh defines the 
term socio-cide, similar to genocide, which means cleansing since the objective of genocide and socio-cide 
is similar although with different approaches. It is the total or partial destruction of an ethnic national or 
religious group but while genocide involves widespread killing is genocide. Israelis use all forms of violence 
in a systematic manner through policies that have long-term effect in halting any economic progress of the 
Palestinian society. To learn more, see “Socio-cide”, symposium held in Ramallah under the theme of Palestin-
ian socio-cide – Khalil Sakakin Center, 28th April 2015. See also, Sari Hanafi – Space cleansing – a new attempt 
to understand the strategies of the Israeli colonial project, Almustaqbal Alarabi – Arab Unity Studies Center, 
Beirut – issue 360, 2009
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10. Random urban sprawl
To analyze the causes of the urban sprawl, we asked some contractors who an-
swered as follows: Mr. Mahmoud Diab31, talking about investment in Kufur Aqab, 
said, “From investment point of view, this does not incur huge expenses like other 
places. For instance, you pay water taxes and other documents needed for the 
council. Still the investment is profitable because you can build several floors with 
many apartments. The only problem is that people phase payment over five or 
more years. Investors feel they are selling in vain.” Sameer Fayalah32 agrees and 
adds when asked about who determines the number of floors and building ar-
31 Interview with Mahmoud Diab, Housing Contractor, 1 August 2015. 
32 Interview with Sameer Khayry Fialah, 1 August 2015
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eas, “the land owner. You may build up to 17-18 floors in Ramallah. However, by 
habits and for respect, we usually build far from the street and residential zones. 
There is not authority other than the landowner to decide on the setbacks from 
the street and neighboring buildings. Many buildings are adjacent to the street.” 
When asked about the technical architectural and space features, he answered 
about the number of flats per floor, “nobody determines this either. In the end 
result, you have a commodity and you must present the best commodity to the 
Jerusalemites. Therefore, I own the most expensive apartments because I only sell 
top quality. People here are annoyed with the way of sale. I do not sell to anybody. 
I set strict conditions on my tenants. Kufur Aqab is an area without law or justice 
and I have the right to set my own conditions to make them abide by my rules. 
Therefore, I must choose those who are going to live here.
Speaking of the guarantees needed for real estate development, he said, “we use 
checks that may be payable over ten years. But these guarantees are “act of god” 
and may span ten years because there is abundant offer and clients abuse of this. 
The market is highly competitive; I personally do not ask for a down payment. 
Otherwise, I cannot sell. Everybody lives an adventure in Kufur Aqab. The Apart-
ment remains registered in my name until the last check is paid. But it is possible 
to receive repayment of the first checks and then payment stops. There is no law 
that allows me to reacquire the apartment. Therefore, contractors use gangs.
Answers of respondents show that Kufur Aqab has become an investment-ap-
pealing zone. Mr. Fialah, a contractor, prefers to invest in Kufur Aqab rather than in 
Ramallah and explains, “Because the PA shares all of your investment. They allow 
us to build only on 36% of the lad and limit the number of floors to 4. So, if the 
building has 8 floors, I will have to sell the apartment for 400000 Dollars to gener-
ate profit if I bought the land for a million dollars, at Ramallah current land prices.”
When we asked a village council member, Mr. Rashed Barkat33, about the reason 
of increasing investment in Kufur Akab, he answered: “investment is easy here and 
does not need license. We do not a digging permit or ask neighbors. Neighbors 
do not intervene or object to any violations. There is no building law; all that mat-
ters is citizens’ safety. After the problem occurs, the come to the council although 
in the outset, the tenant or buyer does not ask the landlord for any legal deeds.”
33  Rashed Barakat, Real Estate Developer, Village Council Member, Interview on 18 August 2015
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To find out more, we asked village council member, Mr. Ashraf Thabtah34 about laws 
and regulations governing building and contractors’ investment in Kufur Aqab, he 
answered “there is no law or legal procedures. As I explained before, all buildings 
are in violation of the law.” We then asked further why people buy apartments in 
Kufur Aqan and what is their legal protection? What are the procedures applicable 
to the purchase of apartments”, he added, “there is no property registration in Ku-
fur Aqab, but rather irrevocable power of attorney, certified by a notary public. 
The notary public in this case is “only Israeli”. People buy here because it is cheaper 
compared to buying in Jerusalem where an apartment may cost 200 to 300 thou-
sand Dollars. He said, “it is like choosing the devil over the deep blue sea. In Kufur 
Aqab, rent is less costly and houses are bigger. Many come to buy here because it is 
a proof they still live within the boundary of Jerusalem. Their blue ID cards are not 
confiscated. Regarding sale of land and whether it is subject to PA rules or the so 
called “Jerusalem Municipality”, Mr. Thabta said, “the land here is part of the Jerusa-
lem area and most of them are sold because of very high demand and small offer. 
The remaining land of Kufur Aqab is under P control. People in Qalandia buy their 
to invest, but there is virtually no empty land in Kufur Aqab. Therefore, we have 
this vertical expansion of construction.” To the eye, the architecture of Kufur Aqab 
differs from the scene in Ramallah and Albiereh where regulations prevent vertical 
expansion above 5 to 6 floors and precondition a ceiling. 
When we checked whether Jerusalemites would have bought flats and land or in-
vested in Kufur Aqab without the policies and restrictions on their ID cards, the an-
swer was no. Kufur Aqab for many people is expensive because its inhabitants have 
a Jerusalem ID and their income and purchase power are higher. Everything here 
is more expensive starting from juice pack to apartments. It is however cheaper 
than inside Jerusalem. Without the restrictions on ID maintenance, there would 
not have been this boom in Kufur Aqab. Most people rent flats here as a proof of 
their residency in Jerusalem, but they actually live in other places. Another con-
tractor from outside Kufur Aqab, when asked about why he invested there, replied, 
“why invest in building in Kufur Aqab? 35 Because the proprietor grants workers 
insurance while in Ramallah there is no labor insurance. Additionally, the pay here 
is higher than in Ramallah and it is made in cash. Most workers in the Wet Bank are 
all with West Bank ID. There are no workers with a Jerusalem ID in Kufur Aqab. Take 
the plumber for instance; in Jerusalem, he would make NIS 600 a day. How would 
34 Interview with Ahraf Thabtah,  Tax Collection/Village Council, on 13 August 2015
35 Interview with Mr. Islam Ladadwah, Contractor, on 5 August 2015
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they waste such a daily pay and come to Kufur Aqab to work for NIS 150 a day. And 
who will employ a plumber from Jerusalem to work in the West Bank?”
It seems there are imaginary advantages of the colonizers’ zones and their self-
classification. The justifications for each group are different and each one has its 
own rationale and presents its justifications from their point of view. They either 
have economic reasons or deal with the area as if it were another country. This is 
due to lack of harmonization of laws, as we explained before about the differenti-
ated imaginary of Palestinians as colonizing subjects based on the socio-colonial 
engineering. When asked about his opinion of the building in Kufur Aqab, he re-
plied, “very bad. The construction is of poor quality. The buildings rise out of a 
sudden without any engineers or supervisors. The whole job is “rubbish” starting 
with the cement through to the electricity and water connections. The material 
used is the worst and the construction components are low quality made in Chi-
na. It all depends on the conscience of the contractor. If they all act against their 
conscience, there is always a possibility that the house or building will fall, like 
“Alsalaymah building” which had a crack in the middle and its inhabitants were 
evacuated.”
We asked, “nobody is held accountable in this case? “Of course not, there isn’t any 
law to hold the contractor accountable. There is no legal contract signed between 
the contractor and landlord. The only contract is a verbal one therefore there is 
no possible liability.” When we asked if investors wish to live in Kufur Aqab since 
it is an attractive zone, their answer was most of them would not. A respondent 
said, “never, first because the rent is too high to the West Bankers. For the Jerusa-
lemites, it is low since they would be asked to pay 1000$ for rent in Biet Hanina. 
To them the 2000 NIS (500$) is reasonable in Kufur Aqab. Moreover, the Jerusa-
lemites see living in Kufur Aqab better because it is closer to Ramallah and they 
can purchase their needs in Ramallah, which is still less expensive than Jerusalem.
When we asked if Kufur Aqab is appealing to holders of green ID’s (West Bank) to 
buy a piece of land or a building? The answer was affirmative, “no way, the best 
donum in Kufur Aqab would cost 350,000 and construction cost 350,000. With 
700,000 $, you can buy all of Ramallah. In cases where one of the partners is a 
Jerusalemite or the wife has a Jerusalem ID, then yes. Otherwise, it would be im-
possible even if they have strong acquaintance here. This perception is inaccurate 
since questionnaires showed that other people still wish to live in Kufur Aqab.
We then investigated other socioeconomic segments. We interviewed a doctor 
who has recently opened a practice in Kufur Aqab. His answers were affirmative 
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about refusing to live in Kufur Aqab. Why don’t you live in Kufur Aqan? “Am I  crazy 
to live in Kufur Aqab!!” Why would you be crazy to live in Kufur Aqab? “First of all, 
I live in Shufat and it is the most prestigious neighborhood, like Almasyoun in 
Ramallah. Moreover, there is no safety in Kufur Aqab, no police or whatsoever. Of 
course, around buildings, there are surveillance cameras, but they are only there.” 
If this is the case, why did you open a practice in Kufur Aqab36? “To be honest, I had 
a choice between Kufur Aqab or Tel Aviv, but when I thought carefully, I found it 
better to have my practice in Kufur Aqab. This building belongs to my grandfather 
and as such I would save the 1000 $ I would have paid in Tel Aviv.”
In the same context, Sahar Khateeb37said, “I cam to live in Kufur Aqab because of 
the high rent I used to pay in Jerusalem. I thought therefore of buying a house in 
Kufur Aqab where the rent is lower and I still can maintain my ID. I did not choose 
Kufur Aqab; it chose me. Most people here are in my situation. They live in Kufur 
Aqab either for family reunification – women or men – or to preserve their Jeru-
salem ID.”
Kufur Aqab is not appealing only to investors, but also to residents or social seg-
ments who hold a Jerusalem ID. They need to preserve their ID card or otherwise 
they colonization policies would expel me them out of Jerusalem, which is under 
a full jeudization wave. Its residents are denied the right to building and their 
houses are demolished while their ID cards are regularly confiscated. The other 
segments include spouses of  Jerusalem ID holders and some social classes like 
students or workers since ownership is easy.
Abu Ahmad, who lives in Kufur Aqab, said38 that he lived in Kufur Aqab with his 
wife, who has a Jerusalem ID while he has a West Bank ID. Why do you think there 
is increased demand on living in Kufur Aqab? “Because Kufur Aqab is the Israeli 
plan to evacuate Jerusalem of holders of Jerusalem ID. It is the trap set for the Je-
rusalemites. They went to live in Kufur Aqab for several reasons. It is like our case. 
We moved here to preserve my wife’s Jerusalem ID. They also come to live here 
because of soaring rents in Jerusalem, if you managed to find a house suitable for 
your family to start with. The situation is seemingly more difficult beyond imagi-
nation. The Arnona (property tax is lower here than in Jerusalem. This means we 
pay here a property tax of 3500 NIS while in Jerusalem, we would pay 10000. This 
exhausting for citizens who cannot have this kind of money.” About his view of the 
36 Interview with Dr. Mahdi Marqah, 15 August 2015
37 Interview on 27 July 2015
38 Interview with Abu Mohammad, Clerk, 30 July 2015.
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situation in Kufur Aqab, he said, “we lack security and safety in Kufur Aqab. The PA 
is not present here and has no role. The Israeli police does not enter here either. 
The municipality does not intervene in most activities like building and licensing. 
All a person can do is to relinquish ownership before a lawyer and this is the prop-
erty deed. Otherwise, nothing preserves rights in Kufur Aqab ecxept cases of raids 
against houses. Narcotics are widespread in Kufur Aqab and they kill people we 
also hear shooting of unidentified sources; we do not know who is shooting or at 
whom. Nobody knows. Everybody says it is arm dealers working from Kufur Aqab 
because it is not subject to any law.
We asked him who benefited from Kufur Akab and he said, “Some groups benefit 
from this situation, mainly investors and real estate developers. They abuse of the 
current situation in Kufur Aqab, which is an open market. You may find facilities to 
purchase including soft instalments through writing deferred checks. People do 
not take the deed proving their ownership of the apartment, until all instalments 
are repaid.” West Bank people benefit a lot from Kufur Aqab because it is an impor-
tant labor market, whether in construction or commerce. Some stores sell above 
10000 NIS a month. They sell at prices higher than the West Bank and lower than 
Jerusalem. For the Jerusalemites, these prices are excellent. As such, shop owners 
make high profit. Therefore, some may ignore the lack of security in Kufur Aqab to 
make this kind of profit. Jerusalemites benefit because they have to preserve their 
Jerusalem ID. They try to keep some hope for their children and grand children 
even when they are in dire need for the services not available in Kufur Aqab. Here 
there are no municipal services, wastewater drainage, or waste collection. There 
is no monitoring of building not to mention the problems related to electricity 
and water connection. There is no security here, as we said before. Israel is also 
benefiting from the situation since it is aiming to evacuate Jerusalem of all Pal-
estinians. Israel does not offer any facilities or building licenses. To the contrary, it 
forces people to pay around 45000 $ to get a license and people wait for years to 
be able to build, if they are even allowed to do so..” 
Some people also left their homes empty and settlers expropriated them, claim-
ing they were theirs. Israel can steal land and homes much more quickly and eas-
ily from spouses with different ID cards benefiting from Kufur Aqab to keep the 
Jerusalem ID of either one of them. There is always a problem in the family struc-
ture since one of the spouses cannot move into Jerusalem with his/her family.” 
In the event there is a problem like stealing or aggression, they cannot depend 
on the dwellers of Kufur Aqab. “Usually, they just forget about it and revoke their 
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rights waiting for divine justice. They can call upon Israeli police if they were Jeru-
salemites, but this rarely happens because of the problem this would raise to us 
as Palestinians. Any person reporting incidents to the Israeli police would be ac-
cused of collaborating with the enemy. There are alternative solutions including 
traditional tribal justice and factions, like Qalandia faction, which is very powerful.
11. Architectural Features of Kufur Aqab and their socioeconomic effect
 Similar to other Palestinian cities, glass buildings started to emerge like a form of 
“modern architecture”, which is unfit for the typography and climate of the area. 
These are ready models imported from other countries and suit best cold weath-
ers. Europeans and northern countries, in their attempt to rationalize use of en-
ergy and use solar energy, opted to these models. In Palestine, such architectural 
models are less fit because they consume much energy to cool in the summer or 
even winter since this kind of architecture is not fit for the climate in Palestine.
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We notice from previous interviews that Kufur Aqab has turned into an invest-
ment-appealing environment. Architecturally and space wise, the buildings are a 
total chaos because of the absence of planning and zoning regulations. The effect 
of the colonizer is persistent with the delimitation of the space and the manner of 
occupancy, offering “legalization” of use of the space by settler colonizers, allowing 
them to expand. On the other hand, it limits the space available to the Palestinians. 
Opposite to this colonial plan, there is total absence of any Palestinian plan.
To examine the impact of this type of building and squatter neighborhoods, we 
asked respondents about the social effects of this unplanned architectural sprawl. 
Lack of Social Security
 
The first field observation was a general feeling of lack of social safety or peace. 
We asked many respondents to describe this collective feeling, Ms. Alkhateeb 
said, “Of course, we don’t have safety. Even children ride motorcycles and cars and 
use them to play. They usually pose a threat to the people in the area. There are no 
services, no authority or feeling of belonging. Even the traffic lights were vandal-
ized. There is no mobile phone signal. The telecommunication service provider is 
Israeli “Biezek”, and usually there is no signal.”
A respondent said, “with the absence of “preventive security” forces, we face daily 
problems that cannot be solved. Narcotics are widely used and there are no insti-
tutions to raise awareness of their danger. There is also trade in heavy weapons 
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and violation of the street landscape either through the buildings of the stores. 
There isn’t a single legal building in Kufur Aqab; they all violate building condi-
tions.”
These visions concord with other respondents expressing a feeling of insecurity 
with a zone that turned into home of all illicit acts in an environment where law 
is absent. Many people reported this feeling of insecurity. Ms. Alkhateeb said, “A 
while ago armed people entered into a school. The principal called the Israel and 
Palestinian police. None of them was able to enter into the school. In the end re-
sult, the Palestinian police said, “we are banned any civil or military access to this 
zone.”
12. Law entirely not present and recourse to other references
 
Local authorities representative, like Kufur Aqab village council say, as described 
by Mr. Ahsarf Thabta39, “It is the only PA affiliated institution. Its core task is to 
provide services to inhabitants including waste collection. Actually waste is a vi-
tal problem in Kufur Aqab because of increased population. The local authorities 
also provide electricity and water services and issue tax clearance certificates for 
contractors and inhabitants of Kufur Aqab. Mr Thabta explains, “the colonization 
authorities exercise their power in the manner that serves their colonialist plans. 
He adds, “when it comes to Jerusalem ID holders, they refer to the public service 
center of Kufur Aqab. In general, the services offered by Jerusalem Municipality 
to Kufur Aqab inhabitants cover only 20% of their needs. This is why waste accu-
mulates and there is chaos. There are not services or interest to provide services.
In the absence of laws, inhabitants of Kufur Aqab, like other areas, refer to differ-
ent social institutions to achieve social safety. They refer to clans, conciliation 
committees and political factions, mainly to Fatah, which sometimes intervenes 
to solve problems. Thabta told us, “of course, they intervene in case  of social prob-
lems. This usually happens through awareness campaigns and networking with 
institutions. If there is a problem, conciliation committees intervene as well as Ku-
fur Aqab Faction and Qalandia Faction. There are so many problems, which they 
cannot solve. Not all people accept tribal justice decisions. There is no law.” This 
scene differs from the trends of some respondents who reiterated that factional 
split affected the nature of PA and security apparatuses’ intervention. The security 
39 Interview with Ashraf Thabta, Clerk, Village Council, 15 July 2015
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organs are affiliated with Fatah and people view them differently. A respondent 
close to Hamas said, “Some factions and their discourse are present here without 
any organized effective presence since their activists are prosecuted by the oc-
cupation and the PA…  Others are (factionally) present and officially supported 
but have smaller public… When we asked about whether the people from Hamas 
felt this was a safe area for them since the PA has no access there – Under Oslo Ac-
cords, Kufur Aqab is under full “Israeli” security control – to detain people without 
coordination, the answer was, “there are mutual arrests between the two parties 
to the Palestinian split. Hamas suffocates and arrests Fatah affiliates in Gaza while 
Hamas members are harassed by the PA security apparatuses in the West Bank.
Another respondent said,”Of course not… Unfortunately, the PA, when it comes 
to security issues and prosecuting resistance, they cross the checkpoints... there 
were arrests in Kufur Aqab in the form of “kidnapping”, unfortunately. A lady told 
us, “there is not security in Kufur Aqab for me and my family to live. There is no law 
nor Palestinian nor Israeli police. Kufur Aqab is a hub of prostitution, weapons, 
drugs and outlaws. For instance, this store allows a person to sleep in the store 
because the store was stolen several times. Can you imagine, that even with sur-
veillance cameras, they still managed to streal.
“Suppose I choose to live in Kufur Aqab, how would I know who lives next door 
or in the building. If a person lives or works in Kufur Aqab for some time, he/she 
would be shocked with the stories taking place here. In this place, prostitution 
is facilitated. Renting is possible using the ID of any person. Then nobody wor-
ries about what takes place in the apartment. Of course, those doing illegal acts 
feel safe without any surveillance or punishment. The latest stories we heard was 
about the Qalandiq faction when it unveiled a prostitution house. Such problems 
are usually discovered by accident.”
Interviews revealed that there is no “total absence” of the law. Probably respon-
dents were referring here to the “civil” procedural definition of law, which is not 
enforced. On the other hand, people refer to legal references like political fac-
tions and tribal/ clan conciliation committees. This coexistence of civil legal ref-
erences – Jordanian, Egyptian and “Israeli” laws” under direct occupation, where 
references of laws creating the paralyzed legislative council because of the split 
since over 9 years, leave space to traditional tribal laws to prevail. It is not only a 
status quo, but an old trend that appeared in our reding of the social history of 
families and the external factors that maintained this traditional role, where some 
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families are treated as noble and others are despised. This appeared clearly under 
the Ottoman, British, Jordanian/Egyptian and Israeli rule and even recently un-
der the PA. the PA has actually reinforced tribalism with the creation of the Tribes 
Directorate within the Ministry of Interior. The PLO did not marginalize this clan 
regime, although it claimed otherwise and although many of faction leaders and 
their grassroots do not belong to the “noble” families. Still, the clan remained as a 
major identity reference40.
13. Trans-class relations
Relationship between indigenous inhabitants and new inhabitants is based on 
differences across social groups. It is based on self-proclamation of identity by 
the dwellers comprising this identity and belonging. We refer here to Weber who 
sees identity as a declared feeling of belonging to a social group compared to 
other different and distinct social group within the same social entity, which re-
quires that individuals therein proclaim distinct social identities41. We therefore 
took the initiative to ask about the different social components and found clas-
sical disparities. Some indigenous people have particular social imaginary that 
asserts disparate social subjects in which they imagine the outsiders42. We refer to 
Howard Becker’s logic of social enclaves and their problems. It is a universal scene 
expressed in different places of the world. Researchers speak for instance of:
40 El sakka, Abaher, Palstinian Social Identity : Fragmented Representations and Multiple Overlapping, work-
paper submitted to the second annual conference held on 17 and 18 January 2013, under the theme of 
Palestinian Communities, their representation and the future of the Palestinian Question, p. 5
41 Weber, Max. Economie et Société. Paris: Plon social. Paris: presse universitaires de France. 1971.
42 Becker, Howard, Outsiders. Etudes de sociologie de la déviance ; paris, Ed, A.S Métailié, 1985.
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 “We used to be happy here without this crowdedness. We would take the car qui-
etly. Today, we need an hour and half to find a car to travel. There is no respect of 
the law or social life. Neighbors do not know each other and do not check on one 
another. The city has changed a lot. It is not as it used to be.” Another respondent 
said “nobody is happy with this situation. Everybody wishes to see Kufur Aqab like 
before but we all know this needs a miracle. Many people buy flats and land in 
Kufur Aqab and it is difficult to evacuate any person with such property.” Another 
resident adds, “our life in Kufur Aqab was fine before. We used to exchange social 
visits but today everything is lost and people barely know each other. In the past, 
if a person dies in Kufur Aqb, all of the neighborhood goes to the funeral. Today 
you may find a funeral and a wedding in the same place.
Mr. Rashed Barakat, a resident of Kufur Akab, considers that in 2003-2004 we 
started to see strange faces living in Kufur Aqab. We surrendered to the current 
situation. At first, respectable people came to live and we established social rela-
tions with them. They shared our good and bad times. Today, the situation has 
changed and people no longer connect with each other. Residents of Kufur Aqab 
are Jerusalemites whose only goal is to prove they are residing in Jerusalem. This 
same differentiation applies as well to the social comparison between the original 
zones of the inhabitants and their new place of residence. This is a recurrent issue 
and reminds us of Emile Durkheim work in the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury about the perceptions of the people who recently moved to new areas after 
the industrial revolution. He examined the impact of the emergence of new cities 
in Europe on their feeling of loss of their reference points and association to their 
past and original areas, which they qualified as more intimate, more secure and 
friendlier. The interview with Mrs. Samah Abu Zeid43 confirms this hypothesis; she 
describe her hometown as a better place. When asked about whether she noticed 
a difference between living in her hometown and in Kufur Aqab and where she 
preferred to live, she answered, “yes, there is huge difference. My hometown is 
more beautiful and full of love, social life, family and friends.” Ms. Luna Abu Sharif 
agrees with this perception44. When we asked her about the distinctive feature 
of Biet Hanina for her, she said, “services there are available. The area is clean and 
this is what we are missing here. There is rule of law but no law is applied here. For 
instance, there are no licenses. Although we own our apartment in Kufur Aqab, 
we do not have a title dead to prove it. We only have these papers that all people 
43 Interview with Samah Abu Zeid
44 Interview with Luna Abu Sharief, Employee, Kobat Holim (Israeli Health Insurance System)
74
A Reading  on the Socio Urban Changes in Ramalah and Kufur Aqab
do.”. Iman Abu Shalbak consents. She said, “Kufur Aqab used to be a small village 
without even a school. Most students attended the school in Qalandia. It was 
an empty area with close family relations. At least people knew each other. I do 
not recognize the place any more. I do not know anybody here as I have recently 
moved to the place. You won’t find any independent house except for my par-
ents’ house. My siblings and I suggested to build a tall building in the place of the 
house like many others do. My mother opposed the idea because she loves the 
house and the garden around it. She says, “I will not have people living over my 
head”. The house is surrounded by six tall buildings. We do not have any sense of 
feedom and do not enjoy quietness because there are many people.
When we asked her about her opinion in the social relations in the area, she replied, 
“there are no connections. People do not know each other. There are no relations 
with the neighbors and there is gap between the people “because you do not know 
what type of people you are dealing with”, so no social relations. People here throw 
garbage from the window. They do not care about the street or their neighbor. Chil-
dren play with everything and they do not receive proper education. Children do 
not have clubs to go to and spend their spare time. There are no community orga-
nizations to work on public awareness or at least mitigate the problems.” Similarily, 
Mr. Ali Dawoud45 sees that relations have changed and people are quite different 
from before. If you conduct a study on any housing compound, you will find 20 fami-
lies coming from a different location each. There is no harmony among them unless 
there is a major problem in the building, like a fire or any other problem that threat-
ens them all. When asked, “do you feel that dealing with people in Kufur Aqab who 
are not the indigenous population of the village is a source of fear? The answer was, 
yes of course. You would fear somebody you don’t know because there is this po-
litical issue and fear of partisan affiliations. Because of the nature of my work in the 
village council wehre I have been sitting for many years, I was able to build relations 
with people from different areas. However, other people actually fear dealing with 
strangers, especially that most of them have criminal reocrds and other problems. 
They feel it is necessary to be careful. To the question, do the people of Kufur Aqab 
still practice their original rituals?, the answer was, “there aren’t many rituals these 
days. The Diwan opens for special cases like death, marriage, engagement and such 
occasions. Food is served to the family of the deceased inside the Diwan although 
this same Diwan used to be a place to meet and talk and serve other purposes. 
45 School Teacher, Head of Council for 15 years, currently head of Barakat Family Diwan, old inhabitant of Kufur 
Aqab
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A merchant told us in this regard, “Qalandia the camp is much better off than here. 
There is security control and relations between the people. They know each other 
and respect each other. You find people who have been neighbors for fifty years. 
How couldn’t they be respectful to each other? But in Kufur Aqab, neighbors do 
not know each other. The faction in Qualandia Camp has large mandate and the 
authority to enter into the camp. However, in Um Alsharayet and Kufur Aqab, it 
cannot arrest or imposed any form of authority.”
We observe here common examples of dealing with the alien/ non-“original” pop-
ulation as a source of anxiety, fear and suspicion. The negative perception of these 
people exhibit the inability of a certain segment of the population to cope with 
the rapid changes that followed the emigration of many people into their area. It 
is clear that inhabitants long for the traditional institutions of social safety in the 
absence of modern institutions. It is known that the Diwan (clan), as an institution, 
played a key role in the urban and village formations to solve family problems and 
even in interventions in the Palestinian public spaces46. It is however clear  that its 
role in this area is limited. When we asked whether the “original” residents of Ku-
fur Aqab melted with comers from all areas, the answer was no since the houses 
of the native population are in areas where no further building is possible. Con-
sequently, Kufur Aqab appears as a partitioned zone with very few “indigenous” 
population compared to the current population that increased over the past ten 
years. There is high rate of immigration to USA. Almost 90% of the people immi-
grate to America. We speak here of very limited geographic space since a large 
part of Kufur Aqab lands turned into tall buildings. 
14. Growth of Formal and Informal Economic Activity
Any observer of Kufur Aqab will notice that investment is not limited to apart-
ments since the area is noticeably commercially active. This is obviously the result 
of demographic density, but this is not the only reason. There are other reasons 
that boosted trade and small businesses. Abu Salah says47, ‘it is simply that rent in 
Kufur Aqab is lower than Ramallah and profit on goods is higher.”. However, there 
are other reasons that encourage social segments to live in Kufur Aqab. We see 
plenty of stores exercising tax evasion, including a tobacco shop that moved from 
46 For further information, refer to our study in French: Al Diwan : «Une institution entre transmission et re-
production sociale», dans Bouget D. et Karsenty S. (dir.), Regards croisés sur le lien social, Paris, L’Harmattan, 
2005, pp.351-363.
47 Owner of carpets store – Kufur Aqab 
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Ramallah to Kufur Akab to avoid the high taxes imposed by both the colonizing 
power and the PA. Any observer of the economic activity in Kufur Aqab will see 
similar business to those in other Palesitnian urban zones. There are restuarants 
with traditional print and other globalized and fast food ones. Economic activ-
ity clashes within the same zone. You see for instance Alsalam Shoe Store next 
to Naseef gas station and other small businesses like Falafel Abu Ali in an iron 
container in the middle of the street, reiterating the residential and commercial 
un-planning. 
15. Urban Zone full of Negative Social Perception 
Different interviews showed that the area is perceived as ill reputed. A female re-
spondent said, any citizen living in Kufur Akab will be vulnerable to the negative 
stereotyping. According to some respondents, “Kufur Aqab is a “charge”. People 
will treat you differently if you tell them you are from Kufur Aqab, especially if 
you are dealing with capital owners or PA officials. There is nothing positive in 
this zone except the fact you can find good jobs there, even of most work comes 
via the networks. However, the networks here are guaranteed because they are 
Israeli. After 5 bounced checks, your account will be suspended.
16. The colonized Aware of Israeli Plans
Residents are fully aware that the colonizer plays a key role in the manufacturing 
of the place. They, as inhabitants, see themselves as victims, but hold the civil soci-
ety and PA institutions accountable for the deterioration of their living standards. 
People in Kufur Aqab fully understand the plans of the colonization. Mrs. Alkha-
teeb, for instance, says “Jews turn their back” to Kufur Aqab to jeudize it. This is 
why we have to facilities to live in Jerusalem. I lived in Jerusalem for 19 years, dur-
ing which I moved to 6 houses. Every time there was a problem with the house. 
Israeli dos not give us building licenses or any other facilities granted to the Is-
raelis. Even when you apply for a license, and that you live in Biet Hanina, it may 
take up to 15 years to receive an approval. She added, “what forced us into this 
misery, is the more miserable situation we had.” A village council respondent, Mr. 
Abdeljaber Barkat48says, “Israel very clearly encourages stealing and law-breaking. 
It abandoned the area from security perspective and not at all interested in it. For 
instance, 60% of the cars in Kufur Aqab are stolen. Israel intervenes only when 
48 Interview on 29 July 2015
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there is a wanted member of Hamas. Only in this case we see the Israeli police. 
Problems are settled via tribal justice, if solved, and after fastidious coordination 
with the Palestinian police. Problems usually end with banning you access to the 
area. If a resident reports a problem, he/she will be accused of “collaborating” with 
the enemy.
17. Colonialist representations
Based on our previous perceptions, Kufur Aqab and its occupants represent part 
of the colonizer’s planning, geography and population classification. It is also part 
of the settlement mechanisms of the colonized themselves. The Palestinians pro-
duce colonialist representations according to a number of imagined privileges. 
The paper analyses the previously produced colonial practices under other colo-
nial contexts – i.e. the “Israeli” colonizer division of different areas into colonized 
areas of privilege concordant with colonial categorization linked to the colonial 
engineering and “geopolitical” policies of the harmonized colonized spaces (Fou-
cault). The colonized, reproduce the colonial discourse of these colonialist differ-
entiations like: considering the inhabitants of the colonies different in terms of 
the privileges given to them by the colonization. Colonialized self-differentiation 
of the Palestinians in the areas occupied in 1947, in the first colony, compared to 
the inhabitants of Jerusalem. Then there is the differentiation between the resi-
dents of Jerusalem against those of the West Bank, and those of Ramallah com-
pared to those in northern West Bank and those in the West Bank compared to 
those in Gaza. Based on this logic, the colonizer creates social hierarchies, which 
fabricate imaginary identities of privileges of socioeconomic subjects loaded with 
colonizational culturalist stereotyping. 
We see here some field remarks about residents with blue ID cards. These Jerusa-
lemites have an arrogant manner. They make noise with their cars when they drive 
or what people call vandalism on the streets. Since the Oslo Accord prevents the 
Palestinian police from entering areas under Israeli control, and that local commit-
tees are denied any right to intervene, we also observe other phenomena including 
disrespect of traffic lights and rules. Actually drivers’ attitude changes before Qua-
landia Checkpoint. They immediately take off their seat belts. Certainly, not only 
drivers with Israeli-plated cars drive from the rules in the Palestinian urban space, 
but many others act as such. However, this takes a special form in Kufur Aqab to the 
extent that some act indiscriminately thinking, as young men, there is no control 
over them by the Palestinian police, because of what we explained earlier. 
78
A Reading  on the Socio Urban Changes in Ramalah and Kufur Aqab
18. Conclusion
Taking into consideration the changes in the socioeconomic, transportation, 
space, place and environmental dimensions, we notice that the increased de-
mand on housing in Kufur Aqab increases the uses of space in architectural term 
of basic functions like housing, transportation, waste, recreational services. Those 
do not entail sufficient services to influence the type of space needed and re-
spond to the inflation of this suburb, we can conclude the following: 
I. There is squatter housing inflation with absence of legislation and planning. 
There is lack of harmony in the space and socioeconomic distribution of urban 
areas between Jerusalem and Ramallah. This triggered the emergence of this un-
balanced housing zone where there is concentrated demographic eight, com-
pared to other zones. It is unconsciously evacuating Jerusalem of its inhabitants.
II. Based on the general information and state of infrastructure in Kufur Aqab, as 
mentioned by our respondents, it appears that passing to this zone via main roads 
to Kufur Aqab and from these roads to the city (Ramallah and Albiereh) is miser-
able. There are few lanes and smalle sidewalks. The sidewalks and setbacks in front 
of the stores are narrow. The lanes are interrupted and unusually crowded because 
of exploitation of the setback areas by street vendors and temporary building. 
Consequently, cars park on sidewalks and even on the street lanes. Since pedestri-
ans are unable to use the [occupied] sidewalks, they share the street with the cars 
and cross the streets at random. Consequently, passage area is reduced and road 
safety deteriorates as pedestrians and vehicles are vulnerable to accidents, mainly 
to e knocked of. Kufur Aqab lives traffic congestion in daytime. All projects imple-
mented and being implemented thus far by the Palestinian Autority to improve 
traffic on the main roads leading to Kufur Aqab aborted. As a result of the agree-
ments signed between the PA and the colonial state, which the latter does not 
abide by while the former upholds to, the state of Kufur Aqab main roads, which 
is the street connecting Jerusalem to Ramallah, is miserable. The different proj-
ects proposed remain constrained with the “Israeli” colonial planning either by 
improving the conditions at a checkpoint or devising plans and projects normal-
izing – even legitimizing -the checkpoints. Even the policies of donor countries 
to these projects sustain the status quo, which does not undermine the colonial 
realm. They actually fund paving of streets and lances while digging together, in a 
manner that does not jeopardize the Israeli colonial engineering plans.
III. Palestinian cities are residential centers endured unplanned process and chaos 
with its urban expansion. At times, it faced misuse of land or overlapping use 
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of land due to arbitrary distribution. The Israeli colonial policies and emergen-
cy state laws, imposed by military orders, serve the Israeli government’s greed 
for settlement expansion. This concords with increased colonial Israel control 
of the spatial development of the Palestinian Territory including Kufur Aqab, 
which represents an example of this state. The study of Kufur Aqab shows that 
the dominant logic in this area is linked to the geography of colonial hege-
mony, i.e. absence of any urban planning, which remains restricted to the con-
trolled areas. In other terms, it is planning for what is available. We actually 
notice that most planning processes stem from a perception of a “two-state” 
solution, which constitutes part of the proposals linked to the imaginary of 
political projects associated to funders’ agenda. It contradicts with the colonial 
practices of social engineering that transforms the demographic nature of the 
space and confiscates land to dig bypass roads to serve the colons and pre-
serve fixed and mobile checkpoints. It imposes facts on the ground. 
IV. There seems to be confused in the public Palestinian urban policies, which are sup-
posed to determine the pattern of urban development. Consequently, squatter ar-
eas appeared in Kufur Aqab, in poor quality of urban environment and random 
expansion. This coincided with imbalance in the development of main centers 
pushing many families to emigrate from parts of the West Bank into Kufur Aqab. 
Moreover, Jerusalem inhabitants who are forced to show their connection to Jeru-
salem in the manner prescribed by the colonization authorities, land in Kufur Aqab.
V. The growth of a “liberal economy”, which undermines the proliferation of the real 
estate sector, which generates quick profit, pushing residents to invest in this lu-
crative sector. It is also linked to credit policies that turned residents into borrow-
ers as per the vision of the “World Bank” and “International Monetary Fund”. It also 
stems from the public policies associated with “rentier economy” that depends on 
external aid and boosts a consumerist culture and lifestyle with “living on credit” 
models and maximized consumption trends, offered to new employees and young 
people. The discourse used preoccupies citizens with the desire to own a company 
and a vehicle. It is supported by bank policies that transform residents into bor-
rowers. This consequently influences their social, societal and national visions as-
sociated to their ability or inability to realize the new standardized dreams. Simul-
taneously, the colonizer plans and implements schemes leaving these inhabitants 
in squatter areas.  The study shows that the hypothesis about the “gentrification” 
of Kufur Aqab is an invalid concept in our case study. As we explained, the process 
did not generate an urban zone with bourgeoisie features. And even, the housing 
processes and construction and commercial expansion produced new beneficiary 
segments, but did not represent a form of geographic gentrification. 
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